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INTRODUCTION 
In his dissenting opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 Justice Thomas cited 
Justice Jackson approvingly for the following proposition:  
[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not 
judicial.  Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the 
political departments of the government . . . . They are decisions of a kind . . . 
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not 
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.2 
Under this view, which I will call the “exclusive political control” thesis, the 
judiciary is barred from participating in foreign affairs decision making 
because the Constitution grants the political branches exclusive control over 
foreign policy.  Several scholars have defended variants of the exclusive 
political control thesis.3  This Article demonstrates that the exclusive political 
control thesis is incompatible with the original understanding of the Founders.  
The Article does not defend originalism as a method of constitutional 
interpretation;4 it merely shows that the exclusive political control thesis is 
inconsistent with an originalist approach. 
The Article examines the implementation of U.S. neutrality policy in the 
period from 1793 to 1797.  Other scholars have analyzed the initial formulation 
of U.S. neutrality policy in 1793.5  Scholars who focus narrowly on the year 
1793, when the United States first articulated its neutrality policy, have 
concluded that “the federal courts played a relatively minor role in resolving 
the nation’s foreign affairs problems.”6  However, if one expands the time 
frame of the analysis to include the years 1794 to 1797, when the United States 
confronted a series of issues related to implementation of its neutrality policy, 
a different constitutional picture emerges.  This Article shows that the federal 
 
 1. 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 2. Id. at 582–83 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
111 (1948)). 
 3. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 8 (2005) (claiming that the “founding generation” believed that 
“the bulk of the foreign affairs power was vested in the executive” and that “[c]ourts did not play 
a significant role”); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 944 
(2004) (“[C]ompared to the political branches, the courts suffer from peculiar institutional 
disadvantages that often warrant absolute deference to the decision of the political branches in 
most foreign affairs controversies.”). 
 4. For an insightful analysis of the application of originalist methodology to constitutional 
foreign affairs issues, see Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 5 (2008). 
 5. See, e.g., HARRY AMMON, THE GENET MISSION (1973); WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL (2006); CHARLES MARION 
THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT (AMS Press, 
Inc. 1967) (1931). 
 6. CASTO, supra note 5, at 3. 
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judiciary played a very significant role in implementing U.S. neutrality policy 
during this period. 
Between February 1794 and February 1797, the Supreme Court decided 
twenty-four cases arising from French privateering activities, including 
fourteen published decisions7 and ten unpublished decisions.8  These cases 
accounted for roughly half of the Supreme Court caseload during this period.9  
All of the cases raised issues that were directly related to the most important 
national security issue of the era: how best to maintain U.S. neutrality in the 
 
 7. The fourteen published decisions are: Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 336 (1797); Del Col v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796); Hills v. Ross, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
331 (1796); Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796); Moodie v. The Ship 
Alfred, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796); Arcambal v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); Cotton v. 
Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1796); United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); 
Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796); Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
285 (1796) (this case was consolidated with Geyer v. Michel on appeal); MacDonogh v. Dannery, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188 (1796); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795); United States v. Peters, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795); and Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).  
Technically, United States v. Peters and MacDonogh v. Dannery are not “privateer” cases 
because they involved French naval vessels, not privateers.  Even so, they are included for the 
sake of completeness. 
 8. The ten unpublished decisions are: Wallace v. The Brig Caesar (No. 11), microformed 
on Appellate Case Files of the Supreme Court of the United States 1792–1831 [hereinafter 
Appellate Case Files] (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid 
(No. 17), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); 
Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate 
Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20), 
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The 
Brig Favorite (No. 22), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm 
Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24), 
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The 
Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives 
Microfilm Publications); and Pintado v. The Ship San Joseph (No. 32), microformed on Appellate 
Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications). 
  During this period, one other French privateering case was also entered onto the 
Supreme Court docket: Morphy v. Ship Sacra Familia.  However, there was no Supreme Court 
decision because the French and Spanish consuls agreed to discontinue the case.  See 7 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 50 
(Maeva Marcus ed., 2003) [hereinafter 7 DHSC]. 
 9. During the 1790s, the Supreme Court convened for two terms each year, in February and 
August.  Over the course of seven terms from February 1794 to February 1797, the Court decided 
approximately forty-five cases; this figure depends upon what, precisely, is counted.  For present 
purposes, the main point is that the French privateering cases occupied a very substantial portion 
of the Supreme Court docket during this period.  For detailed information about the Supreme 
Court docket, see 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789–1800, at 157–474, 483–535 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) [hereinafter 1 DHSC] 
(reproducing the Supreme Court Minutes and Docket for the period 1790–1800). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
148 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:145 
ongoing war that pitted France against England, Spain, and other European 
powers.  French diplomats repeatedly lobbied the Executive Branch to remove 
the privateering cases from the courts and resolve them through diplomatic 
means.  From France’s perspective, the cases raised questions about sovereign 
prerogatives and the conduct of naval warfare, which were properly resolved 
through diplomatic negotiation, not private adjudication.  Initially, U.S. judges 
and executive officials were uncertain whether the cases should be resolved 
diplomatically, or by means of private adjudication in U.S. courts.  However, a 
consensus soon emerged among cabinet officers and Supreme Court Justices 
that the federal judiciary should decide the issues raised by the French 
privateering cases in the context of adjudication between the French captors 
and the original ship owners.  Subsequently, despite repeated French 
diplomatic protests, the Executive Branch steadfastly refused to intervene in 
ongoing judicial proceedings.10 
Four features of the French privateering cases, viewed together, 
demonstrate conclusively that the exclusive political control thesis is contrary 
to the original understanding of the Founders.  First, the French privateering 
cases were directly related to the implementation of U.S. neutrality policy, 
which was the most important national security issue of the era.  Second, these 
cases accounted for a very substantial percentage of the Supreme Court docket 
in the initial decade after the adoption of the Constitution.  Third, executive 
and judicial officers reached a consensus that the cases should be resolved 
judicially, not diplomatically.  Fourth, the cabinet officers and Supreme Court 
Justices who formed that consensus included many of the leading figures 
involved in drafting and ratifying the Constitution.11  Given their agreement 
 
 10. Traditional accounts of the neutrality crisis have emphasized the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to issue an advisory opinion to the Executive Branch.  See CASTO, supra note 5, at 107–
15; THOMAS, supra note 5, at 146–50.  In the summer of 1793, the Executive Branch submitted a 
set of questions to the Supreme Court related to French privateering.  See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 747–51 (Maeva 
Marcus ed., 1998) [hereinafter 6 DHSC].  The Court refused to provide an answer, stating that 
“[t]he Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of 
Government . . . afford strong arguments against the Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the 
questions alluded to.”  Id. at 755.  Notwithstanding this incident, though, the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts decided dozens of French privateering cases in the period from 1794 to 
1797, and the Executive Branch consistently refused to intervene in judicial decision making.  See 
infra Part III. 
 11. Three men served as Secretary of State during this period: Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1790 
to Dec. 1793), Edmund Randolph (Jan. 1794 to Aug. 1795), and Timothy Pickering (Dec. 1795 to 
May 1800).  BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–
1989, at 199, 290, 300 (Robert Sobel ed., 1990).  Jefferson’s credentials as one of the key 
constitutional Founders are well known.  Randolph played a key role at both the Constitutional 
Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention.  See Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and 
Beginnings to 1801, in 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 204–17, 
232–36, 375–93 (1971).  Pickering was not a representative to the Constitutional Convention, but 
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that the federal judiciary should play a leading role in implementing U.S. 
neutrality policy, claims by contemporary jurists and scholars that the 
Founders granted the political branches exclusive responsibility for foreign 
policy decision making are simply untenable. 
It bears emphasis that all of the French privateering cases involved 
disputes about the property rights of private parties, and that international law 
provided many of the key substantive rules for resolving those disputes.  Thus, 
the government’s choice to handle these cases through litigation in federal 
courts illustrates two points.  First, the Founders were very comfortable with 
the idea that federal courts would invoke international law to provide rules of 
decision in litigation.12  Second, the Founders recognized that international 
law, or the “law of nations” as it was known at that time, did not merely 
regulate relations between nations: it also conferred rights on private parties.13 
Leading originalist accounts of the constitutional separation of powers in 
foreign affairs have tended to overlook, or give little weight to, the French 
privateering cases.14  This is understandable because the cases themselves say 
very little about the constitutional distribution of power in foreign affairs.  Ten 
of the twenty-four cases did not yield published decisions; in most of those 
 
he did participate in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.  BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–1989, supra, at 290. 
  Two men served as Attorney General during this period: Edmund Randolph (Feb. 1790 
to Jan. 1794) and William Bradford (Jan. 1794 to Aug. 1795).  Id. at 38, 300.  Before becoming 
Attorney General, Bradford was a Justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (1791–1794) and 
Attorney General of Pennsylvania (1780–1791).  Id. at 38. 
  Alexander Hamilton served as Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 1789 to Feb. 1795).  Id. 
at 159–60.  Although he had no formal responsibility for U.S. foreign policy, he was a key 
presidential advisor on a wide range of issues.  Hamilton’s credentials as one of the key 
constitutional Founders are well known. 
  Three men served as Chief Justice during this period: John Jay (Sept. 1789 to June 
1795), John Rutledge (Aug. 1795 to Dec. 1795), and Oliver Ellsworth (Mar. 1796 to Dec. 1800).  
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., AMERICAN LEADERS 1789–1991: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
SUMMARY 68–70 (1991).  John Jay, as is well known, was one of three co-authors of The 
Federalist Papers.  He played a central role during the New York ratifying convention.  See 
Goebel, supra, at 393–412.  Rutledge and Ellsworth both served on the Committee of Detail 
during the Constitutional Convention.  See id. at 232–36.  They also played central roles in their 
state ratifying conventions.  See id. at 337–39 (Ellsworth and Connecticut), 371–75 (Rutledge and 
South Carolina). 
 12. In contrast to some modern litigation, the courts were not utilizing international law as a 
guide to constitutional interpretation.  They were applying international law directly as a rule of 
decision. 
 13. See generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789–1914 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(2007) (providing a very comprehensive account of the constitutional law of foreign affairs, as it 
was understood by the founding generation, but devoting very little attention to the French 
privateering cases). 
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cases, the Court did not produce any written rationale.  In many of the fourteen 
published decisions, the Court’s written rationale says nothing about the 
separation of powers issues that are the central focus of this Article.  To shed 
light on these issues, the author analyzed a wide variety of ancillary materials 
related to the French privateering cases, including the Supreme Court papers in 
the National Archives,15 other sources that present arguments advanced by the 
parties in the privateering cases,16 the decisions of lower courts,17 executive 
branch documents,18 and diplomatic correspondence with France and 
England.19 
The analysis of these ancillary materials suggests that the Founders did not 
envision the lines separating the three branches of the federal government as 
 
 15. The author spent two days in the National Archives conducting research for this paper.  
He reviewed the Supreme Court case files for ten of the twenty-four cases referenced above, 
including two published cases, and eight unpublished cases.  The two published cases are: 
Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796), and Moodie v. The Ship Alfred, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796).  The eight unpublished cases are: Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 
17), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. 
The Brig Eliza (Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives 
Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate Case 
Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20), 
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The 
Brig Favorite (No. 22), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm 
Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24), 
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); and Moodie v. 
The Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives 
Microfilm Publications). 
 16. Many of the previously unpublished documents associated with the French privateering 
cases are collected in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, and 7 DHSC, supra note 8.  These materials, 
together with the materials in the National Archives, are invaluable for understanding the 
arguments advanced by the parties in these cases. 
 17. Judge Thomas Bee, the federal district judge in South Carolina, decided fourteen of the 
twenty-four cases referenced above, as well as some other French privateering cases that never 
reached the Supreme Court.  Judge Bee’s decisions in admiralty cases were published in 1810 in 
a separate volume entitled REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA BY THE HON. THOMAS BEE (Phila., William P. Farrand & Co. 1810) [hereinafter 
BEE’S ADMIRALTY REPORTS].  Many of these cases were also published later in the “Federal 
Cases” collection. 
 18. Numerous executive branch documents related to the privateering cases are reproduced 
in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, and 7 DHSC, supra note 8, and in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & 
Seaton 1833) [hereinafter 1 ASPFR], available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/ 
lwsplink.html, and 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS (Walter Lowrie & 
Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832), available at  http://memory. 
loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html. 
 19. Much of the extensive diplomatic correspondence related to the French privateering 
cases is preserved in volumes 1 and 2 of ASPFR, supra note 18. 
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impenetrable, immovable walls.  To the contrary, the key government decision 
makers in the 1790s believed that they were engaged in a cooperative effort in 
which all three branches of the federal government worked together to promote 
U.S. foreign policy objectives.  Responsibility for foreign policy decision 
making was not divided into neat, separate boxes labeled “legislative,” 
“executive,” and “judicial.”  The foreign policy challenges facing the young 
nation were too important to allow artificial “walls” separating the branches of 
government to impede the active cooperation of all three branches in working 
together to solve vital national security problems. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts.  Part I provides 
background on French privateering in the 1790s.  Parts II and III proceed 
chronologically.  Part II examines the period from February 1793, when France 
declared war on Great Britain and Holland, until June 1794, when Congress 
enacted legislation to address the problems posed by French privateering 
activities in the United States.20  During this period, the U.S. government 
worked out the basic division of responsibility between the Executive and 
Judicial Branches and decided that the judiciary should handle many of the 
issues arising from French privateering activities.  Part III analyzes the period 
from June 1794 until February 1797, when the Supreme Court decided 
Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance,21 the last of the French privateering cases.  
During this period, British consuls utilized the U.S. judicial system to harass 
French privateers and gain a tactical advantage in the ongoing naval war 
between France and Great Britain.  By instigating litigation in U.S. courts, the 
British consuls imposed substantial economic costs on French privateers.  
Those costs, combined with other factors, ultimately induced the privateers to 
take their captured prizes elsewhere, rather than bringing the prizes to U.S. 
ports, where they would be subjected to protracted litigation.  The Article 
concludes with some observations about the contemporary relevance of the 
French privateering cases. 
I.  BACKGROUND: FRENCH PRIVATEERING IN THE 1790S 
In the late eighteenth century, “privateering” was a common means of 
warfare.22  If a nation with a relatively weak naval force became embroiled in 
warfare, it could augment its naval power by commissioning privateers to fight 
on its behalf.  The term “privateer” refers both to privately owned ships that 
fought on behalf of a government and to people who operated those ships.  If a 
man wanted to fight as a privateer on behalf of a government, he would have to 
 
 20. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381. 
 21. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797). 
 22. The discussion of privateering in this paragraph is drawn primarily from William R. 
Casto, Foreign Affairs Crises and the Constitution’s Case or Controversy Limitation: Notes from 
the Founding Era, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 241–43 (2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
152 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:145 
bear the expense of purchasing an appropriate ship, fitting it for warfare, and 
hiring a crew.  He would also have to obtain a commission, sometimes called a 
“letter of marque,” from a duly authorized government officer.23  Armed with 
such a commission, the privateer was authorized to capture enemy merchant 
vessels.  The privateer would bring captured vessels to a “prize court,” a 
judicial body authorized to declare whether the captured vessel was a lawful 
prize.  If it was a lawful prize, the captors could sell the ship and its cargo and 
keep the money for themselves.  Thus, the privateering system utilized the 
profit motive as a force multiplier to enhance the naval power of a nation at 
war. 
As of March 1793, France was at war not only with England, but also with 
Austria, Prussia, Spain, and the Netherlands.24  France’s naval power was no 
match for the combined naval forces of its enemies.  Accordingly, France 
decided to make extensive use of privateers to supplement its naval forces.  
The chief mission of the privateers, from France’s perspective, was to disrupt 
the trade of its enemies.  To perform this mission effectively, the privateers had 
to operate near the ports that were used to conduct the enemies’ trade.  Hence, 
France deployed some privateers in the European theater and others in the 
Western hemisphere. 
Deployment of privateers in the Western hemisphere posed tactical 
problems for France.  It made no sense for privateers operating in the Western 
hemisphere to carry their prizes back to France to be condemned by prize 
courts in France.  The trans-Atlantic journey was time-consuming and 
hazardous: too many prizes would be lost en route.  France established some 
prize courts in French colonies in the Caribbean,25 but the British effectively 
blockaded key French ports in the Caribbean for at least some of the period 
under study, making it difficult for privateers to take their prizes to Caribbean 
ports.26  Accordingly, France instructed many of its privateers in the Western 
hemisphere to take their prizes to U.S. ports.27 
France’s attempt to utilize U.S. ports as a base of operations for French 
privateers posed a significant policy dilemma for the United States.  On the 
 
 23. With respect to letters of marque, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
61, 84 (2007). 
 24. See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 
140 (noting that “a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the 
United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other”); see also Edict of His Majesty, 
King of Spain (Mar. 23, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 425–26 (noting that 
France declared war against Spain on March 16). 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795) (describing situation where 
a French naval vessel captured a merchant ship and took it to a French port in the Caribbean, 
where it was condemned as a prize by a French prize court). 
 26. See MELVIN H. JACKSON, PRIVATEERS IN CHARLESTON, 1793–1796, at 19–20 (1969). 
 27. See id. at 6–8. 
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one hand, the United States was eager to honor its treaty commitments to 
France.  On the other hand, President Washington declared in April 1793 that 
the United States would remain neutral in the war between France and its 
various enemies.28  The dilemma arose because the 1778 Treaty with France 
seemingly obligated the United States to adopt a pro-French tilt in the war.  
Specifically, Article 17 granted French privateers broad rights of access to U.S. 
ports,29 whereas Article 22 imposed severe restrictions on access to U.S. ports 
by “foreign privateers . . . who have commissions from any other Prince or 
State in enmity with” France.30 
As Thomas Jefferson stated, “It is an essential character of neutrality, to 
furnish no aids (not stipulated by treaty) to one party, which we are not equally 
ready to furnish to the other.”31  Thus, to implement its neutrality policy and 
honor its treaty commitments to France, the United States had to decide what 
the treaties with France required.  If the U.S. adopted an expansive view of its 
treaty obligations to France, the British (and others) would object that the 
United States was violating its duties as a neutral state; this course potentially 
risked war with Great Britain.  If the United States adopted a narrow view of 
the scope of its treaty obligations, France would object that the United States 
was breaching its treaty commitments; this course potentially risked war with 
France.  Hence, the United States attempted to steer a middle course between 
the Scylla of war with England and the Charybdis of war with France.  Federal 
courts played a critical role in attempting to chart this middle course, in part 
because key officers in the Executive and Judicial Branches agreed that the 
judiciary should assume primary responsibility for making some of the crucial 
decisions. 
II.  U.S. NEUTRALITY POLICY: FROM FEBRUARY 1793 TO JUNE 1794 
Part II analyzes developments from February 1793, when France declared 
war against Great Britain and Holland, until June 1794, when Congress 
enacted legislation to address French privateering activities.  There were two 
main sets of foreign policy issues related to the conduct of French privateers 
during this period.  The first set of foreign policy issues related to the 
substantive rules governing the conduct of French privateers.  The political 
branches generally took the lead in framing substantive rules, and the Judicial 
Branch played a secondary role. 
 
 28. See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 
140. 
 29. See Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., art. XVII, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 22 
[hereinafter 1778 Treaty with France]. 
 30. Id. art. XXII. 
 31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Sept. 7, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 239. 
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The second set of foreign policy issues related to jurisdictional questions: 
when French privateers captured privately owned vessels, and the owners 
sought restitution of the captured property on the grounds that their property 
had been seized illegally, the question arose as to which branch of government 
should resolve these disputes.  Initially, there was some uncertainty as to 
whether the Executive or the Judicial Branch should handle these questions.  
France urged resolution of these disputes through diplomatic means because 
France viewed the privateering cases as contests between nations about 
sovereign rights.  However, a consensus soon emerged among U.S. 
government officials that the Judicial Branch should decide these issues, 
because the privateering cases also involved private disputes about individual 
property rights.  Ultimately, cabinet officials and Supreme Court Justices 
agreed that the judiciary had the primary constitutional responsibility for 
deciding individual disputes over ownership of property, even though the law 
of nations provided most of the governing legal rules and the disputes were 
intimately linked to the wartime strategy of sovereign powers. 
Part II is divided into three sections.  The first section addresses the 
historical context.  The second section analyzes the substantive rules governing 
the conduct of French privateers.  The third section analyzes the interplay 
between the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches in framing the 
jurisdictional rules that ultimately gave the judiciary primary responsibility for 
resolving disputes arising from French privateering activities. 
A. Historical Context 
In January 1793, French revolutionaries executed Louis XVI.  Shortly 
thereafter, on February 1, in the midst of revolutionary fervor at home, France 
declared war on Great Britain and Holland.32  At that point, France was already 
at war with Austria and Prussia.  In March 1793, France also declared war on 
Spain.33 
Although France declared war against Great Britain on February 1, 1793, 
news of the war did not reach the United States until late March or early April.  
President Washington was in Mount Vernon at the time, but he traveled to 
Philadelphia as quickly as possible to convene a meeting of his Cabinet.34  The 
cabinet officers at the time included Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State, 
Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Knox as Secretary of 
War, and Edmund Randolph as Attorney General.35  The President circulated a 
list of questions to the cabinet officers on April 18, and the group convened the 
 
 32. THOMAS, supra note 5, at 24. 
 33. See Edict of His Majesty, King of Spain (Mar. 23, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 425–26. 
 34. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 24–26. 
 35. See id. at 26–28, 66. 
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next day to formulate U.S. policy.36  On April 22, the President publicly issued 
a formal proclamation of neutrality, declaring the U.S. policy to “pursue a 
conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers.”37 
On April 8, 1793, Edmond Genet arrived in Charleston, South Carolina to 
assume his position as the new French Ambassador to the United States.38  
Beginning immediately after his arrival, Genet undertook a series of actions 
that posed substantial challenges for U.S. foreign policy.  First, Genet began 
commissioning U.S. citizens to act as privateers in the service of the French 
government.39  Second, Genet provided financial assistance to U.S. and French 
citizens who accepted commissions to serve as privateers for France.40  With 
Genet’s financial aid, the privateers purchased ships and utilized U.S. ports to 
arm their ships for naval warfare.41  Additionally, Genet instructed French 
consuls in major U.S. ports to establish prize courts.  Consequently, French 
privateers commissioned by Genet and outfitted in the United States began 
bringing their prizes into U.S. ports so that French consuls operating prize 
courts on U.S. territory could adjudicate the lawfulness of their prizes.42 
In part due to the policies he pursued, and in part due to his confrontational 
style, Genet quickly made many enemies in the U.S. government.  Hence, in 
August 1793, the United States decided to request the recall of Ambassador 
Genet.43  The French government granted that request in October 1793, and 
Genet’s replacement, Joseph Fauchet, arrived in the United States in February 
1794.44 
In the fourteen months after President Washington issued his neutrality 
proclamation, there were three key milestones in the development of the U.S. 
response to French privateering activities.  First, on August 4, 1793, the 
Treasury Secretary (Alexander Hamilton) promulgated regulations for the 
guidance of U.S. customs collectors.45  Second, on February 18, 1794, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey.46  Third, on 
 
 36. See id. at 26–41. 
 37. See Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 
140. 
 38. AMMON, supra note 5, at vii. 
 39. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 698 (John Catanzariti ed., 1995). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Casto, supra note 22, at 243. 
 43. See The Recall of Edmond Charles Genet, in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
supra note 39, at 685–715. 
 44. See AMMON, supra note 5, at 155–59. 
 45. Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 140–41. 
 46. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).  The precise date is recorded in The Minutes of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Feb. 18, 1794), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 229. 
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June 5, 1794, Congress enacted legislation that was designed to regulate the 
activities of French privateers in U.S. ports.47  The Treasury regulations and 
the subsequent legislation defined the key substantive rules governing the 
conduct of French privateers.  In contrast, the Supreme Court decision in Sloop 
Betsey addressed important jurisdictional questions, and resolved key 
constitutional separation of powers issues that had been percolating in the 
Executive Branch and in the lower federal courts for the previous year. 
B. Substantive Rules Governing Privateers 
This section discusses the main substantive issues related to French 
privateering: (1) whether French privateers could sell their prizes in U.S. ports; 
(2) whether France could recruit U.S. citizens to serve as privateers on behalf 
of France; and (3) whether French privateers could utilize U.S. ports to outfit 
civilian vessels for naval warfare or to augment the military capabilities of 
vessels that were already equipped for naval warfare. 
1. Sale of Prizes 
In traditional European wars, a privateer who captured a prize would bring 
it to a prize court in his home country to obtain a judgment confirming that it 
was a lawful prize.48  Then, when he sold the prize and its cargo, he could 
invoke the judgment of the prize court to prove that he had a legally valid title 
to the property he was selling.49  France attempted to export this model to the 
Western hemisphere by establishing French prize courts on U.S. territory.50  
The key strategic goal was to provide financial incentives for prospective 
privateers to operate in the American theater by establishing a juridical system 
that would ensure their ability to sell captured property for financial gain.  
Without the economic inducement of a solid return on investment, France 
would be unable to enlist sufficient numbers of privateers, and its military 
strategy would fail. 
Accordingly, Genet instructed French consuls in the United States to 
establish prize courts on U.S. territory.51  Genet believed that France had a 
right to do so under Article 12 of the 1788 Consular Treaty between the United 
States and France.52  However, the Washington Administration did not agree 
 
 47. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381. 
 48. See Casto, supra note 22, at 242–43. 
 49. See id. at 242. 
 50. Id. at 243. 
 51. THOMAS, supra note 5, at 206–07. 
 52. Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and Vice 
Consuls, U.S.-Fr., art. XII, Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. 106.  Article 12 authorized French consuls, for 
example, to adjudicate disputes between a French captain and his crew while they were docked at 
U.S. ports.  See id.  It was quite a stretch, though, for Genet to suggest that Article 12 authorized 
France to establish prize courts on U.S. territory. 
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that the Treaty granted France any such right.  Moreover, the Executive Branch 
viewed Genet’s effort to establish French prize courts on U.S. territory as a 
flagrant violation of U.S. sovereignty and neutrality.53  Consequently, Jefferson 
wrote directly to the French consuls and vice consuls in the United States 
(bypassing Genet), warning them that they would be subject to prosecution and 
punishment if they, “within the United States, . . . assume to try the validity of 
prizes, and to give sentence thereon, as judges of admiralty.”54 
Importantly, although the Executive Branch determined that any judgment 
issued by a French prize court operating on U.S. territory was “a mere 
nullity,”55 the government did not attempt to block the sale of prizes in U.S. 
ports by French privateers.56  The decision not to interfere with the sale of 
captured prizes and their cargo was significant because it preserved a financial 
incentive for French privateers to bring their captured prizes to U.S. ports.  If a 
privateer sold his prize without first obtaining a valid judgment from a prize 
court, the ship itself would sell at a discounted price because the buyer had to 
assume the risk that the original owner might file a legal action to claim title to 
the vessel.57  However, privateers could sell captured cargo at full value 
because the buyers did not face a significant risk of subsequent legal action by 
the original owners.  Overall, the financial incentives were sufficient to induce 
French privateers to bring captured prizes to U.S. ports and sell them for 
financial gain.58 
 
 53. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 38–39. 
 54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to French Consuls (Sept. 7, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 175. 
 55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 38. 
 56. See Message from George Washington to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), as reprinted in 1 
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 140 (“I have not thought myself at liberty to forbid the sale of the 
prizes, permitted by our treaty of commerce with France to be brought into our ports . . . .”); see 
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 705–06 (explaining and defending U.S. position on 
sale of prizes in U.S. ports). 
 57. Assume, for example, that a French privateer captured a British merchant vessel and sold 
the British vessel to an American merchant who wanted to use the vessel to conduct trans-
Atlantic trade.  If the French privateer obtained a valid judgment from a prize court before selling 
the captured ship to the American buyer, then the buyer would obtain a secure title protected by 
that judgment.  But if the American buyer purchased a ship that had not been condemned by a 
prize court as a valid prize, and the buyer then sailed the ship to a French port, the original British 
owner could initiate a legal action in a French prize court to challenge the legality of the initial 
capture.  If the British owner prevailed, the American buyer would lose possession of the vessel 
and would have little recourse against the French privateer who sold him the vessel. 
 58. See JACKSON, supra note 26, at 127–53 (providing detailed information about the sale of 
British, Spanish, and Dutch prizes captured by French privateers and brought to the ports of 
Charleston, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia between April 1793 and April 1796). 
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In sum, the Washington Administration “split the baby” by prohibiting the 
establishment of French prize courts on U.S. territory, but permitting the sale 
of French prizes.  This Solomonic solution was generally consistent with 
France’s strategic interests.  As long as French privateers could sell captured 
prizes and cargo in U.S. ports, there would be strong economic inducements 
for privateering, and France would be able to recruit a sufficient number of 
privateers to achieve its military objectives. 
2. Recruiting U.S. Citizens 
As noted above, the success of France’s naval warfare strategy hinged on 
its ability to recruit a sufficient number of individuals to serve as privateers on 
behalf of France.  Article 21 of the 1778 Treaty with France prohibited U.S. 
citizens from taking “any commission or letters of marque for arming any ship 
or ships, to act as privateers against” France.59  From France’s perspective, 
though, it was entirely permissible for U.S. citizens to accept commissions 
from France to act as privateers against France’s enemies.  Hence, immediately 
after Genet arrived in the United States, he began recruiting U.S. citizens to aid 
France’s war effort by serving as captains or crew on French privateers.60 
The United States told France that it viewed Genet’s recruitment of U.S. 
citizens as a contravention of U.S. neutrality policy and urged France to halt 
these activities.61  The August 1793 Treasury regulations instructed U.S. 
customs collectors “to observe, and to notify . . . the case of any citizen of the 
United States who shall be found in the service of either of the parties at 
war.”62  In accordance with the President’s neutrality proclamation,63 federal 
prosecutors brought criminal charges against U.S. citizens who enlisted to 
serve on French privateers.64 
Some critics expressed doubts about the President’s constitutional 
authority to impose criminal penalties for violations of rules promulgated by 
 
 59. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XXI. 
 60. See CASTO, supra note 5, at 45–47. 
 61. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jean Baptiste Ternant (May 15, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 42. 
 62. Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 140, 141. 
 63. The Proclamation expressly directed federal prosecutors to institute prosecutions 
“against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate 
the law of nations, with respect to the Powers at war, or any of them.”  Proclamation of Neutrality 
(Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 140.  As a neutral nation, the United 
States believed it had a duty under the law of nations to ensure that its citizens did not take up 
arms against either side in the war.  The instruction for federal prosecutors to prosecute 
individuals who “violate the law of nations” was intended to fulfill this perceived duty.  Whether 
the law of nations actually prohibited U.S. citizens from taking up arms on behalf of France is 
debatable.  See CASTO, supra note 5, at 92–93. 
 64. See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Penn. 1793) (No. 6360). 
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the Executive Branch.  In June 1794, Congress removed lingering doubts about 
the constitutionality of federal criminal prosecutions by enacting legislation 
that authorized criminal punishment.  The legislation expressly authorized 
criminal penalties for U.S. citizens who “accept[ed] and exercise[d] a 
commission to serve a foreign prince or state in war,”65 and for those who 
“enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince or state . . . as a marine 
or seaman on board of any vessel of war . . . or privateer.”66 
3. Outfitting Ships in U.S. Ports 
To implement its naval warfare strategy, France needed ships equipped for 
naval warfare.  Article 22 of the 1778 Treaty with France prohibited privateers 
commissioned by France’s enemies from outfitting their ships in U.S. ports.67  
France interpreted this provision to mean that privateers commissioned by 
France were permitted to outfit their ships in U.S. ports.68  Hence, Genet 
provided funding to French privateers to help them purchase civilian ships and 
convert them into military vessels by equipping the ships with guns and other 
armaments. 
The United States objected to France’s use of U.S. ports for this purpose, 
arguing that it would be contrary to the United States’ duties as a neutral nation 
to allow France to outfit privateers in U.S. ports without also granting 
equivalent privileges to France’s enemies.69  Accordingly, the August 1793 
Treasury regulations declared: “The original arming and equipping of vessels 
in the ports of the United States, by any of the belligerent parties, for military 
service . . . is deemed unlawful.”70  The regulations instructed U.S. customs 
collectors to keep “a vigilant eye upon whatever may be passing within the 
ports,” and to notify the relevant governor and U.S. Attorney if they observed 
activities inconsistent with U.S. neutrality.71 
Finally, the June 1794 legislation included three provisions to address the 
problem of illegal outfitting in U.S. ports.  First, the statute made it a crime for 
any person within U.S. territory to “fit out and arm . . . any ship or vessel with 
intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign 
prince or state to cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens or 
 
 65. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 1, 1 Stat. 381, 381–82. 
 66. Id. § 2. 
 67. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XXII. 
 68. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 126–28. 
 69. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Sept. 7, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 239 (“In the case where we found ourselves obliged, by treaty, to withhold from 
the enemies of France the right of arming in our ports, we thought ourselves in justice bound to 
withhold the same right from France also, and we did it.”). 
 70. Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs (Aug. 4, 1793), reprinted in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 140, 141. 
 71. See id. at 140. 
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property of another foreign prince or state with whom the United States are at 
peace.”72  The statute also imposed similar penalties for anyone who 
augmented or increased “the force of any ship of war, cruiser or other armed 
vessel” in the service of a foreign state that was at war with a state “with whom 
the United States are at peace, by adding to the number or size of the guns of 
such vessel.”73  Additionally, the statute authorized the President to detain any 
vessel that had been illegally outfitted, or whose force had been illegally 
augmented, in a U.S. port.74 
In sum, during the period from February 1793 to June 1794, the Executive 
Branch played the lead role in framing the substantive rules governing the 
conduct of French privateers in the United States.  Congress later ratified key 
executive branch decisions by enacting legislation in June 1794 that gave the 
force of law to policies adopted by the Executive Branch the previous year.  
The Supreme Court did not make a significant contribution to the substantive 
rules governing the conduct of French privateers.  However, in February 1794, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Executive’s earlier decision concerning 
French prize courts by declaring “that the admiralty jurisdiction, which has 
been exercised in the United States by the Consuls of France . . . is not of 
right.”75 
C. Jurisdictional Issues Involving French Privateers 
There were several cases in which owners of vessels captured by French 
privateers alleged that the capture was unlawful because the privateer seized 
the alleged prize within U.S. territorial waters or because the alleged prize was 
actually a neutral ship, not an enemy ship.  France conceded that the law of 
nations prohibited captures of neutral vessels and captures in U.S. territorial 
waters.  Cases in which ship owners alleged violations of these agreed rules 
raised factual disputes about the ownership of ostensibly neutral vessels and 
the location where captures occurred. 
More fundamentally, though, these cases raised jurisdictional questions 
about who should decide the factual disputes.  The ship owners who 
complained about unlawful captures of their vessels pursued two different 
avenues of relief.  Some took their claims to federal admiralty courts.  Others 
 
 72. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 3, 1 Stat. 381, 383. 
 73. Id. § 4. 
 74. Id. § 7. 
 75. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (emphasis omitted).  By holding 
that French consuls lacked jurisdiction to operate prize courts on U.S. territory, the Supreme 
Court effectively denied res judicata effect to the prior judgments of French prize courts, thereby 
creating an opportunity for the owners of captured vessels to challenge the validity of (French) 
judgments condemning the vessels as prizes.  See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 86 
(1995). 
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sought relief from the federal Executive Branch.  From France’s perspective, 
the disputes between ship owners and French privateers were properly viewed 
as disputes between sovereign nations about the conduct of naval warfare.  
Hence, France urged resolution through diplomatic channels.  Initially, the 
lower federal courts accepted France’s arguments and dismissed several cases 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
However, the Supreme Court ruled in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey that the 
federal courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims by ship owners who alleged 
that their vessels had been seized unlawfully by French privateers.76  The 
Court’s decision reflected a very different conception of the privateering cases: 
the Court viewed these cases as disputes between private parties about 
individual property rights.  Viewed from that perspective, it made sense for the 
Judicial Branch to resolve these disputes.  After the Court’s decision in Sloop 
Betsey, the Executive Branch consistently refused to intervene in judicial 
proceedings, maintaining that the judiciary should handle all disputes about 
seizures of particular vessels by particular French privateers.  Although France 
protested vehemently against the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts, the 
Executive Branch rebuffed French protests and told French diplomats to direct 
their arguments to the Judicial Branch.  Executive officers trusted the courts to 
resolve disputed cases in accordance with settled rules of international law, and 
they assumed that the judicial application of international legal rules would 
help promote the U.S. goal of avoiding war with Great Britain and France. 
This section examines the evolution of jurisdictional rules related to the 
French privateering cases in the period from April 1793 to June 1794.  The 
first subsection discusses the role of the Executive Branch.  The next 
subsection examines decisions by lower federal courts before the Supreme 
Court decision in Sloop Betsey.  The third subsection reviews the Supreme 
Court decision in Sloop Betsey.  The final subsection briefly considers the role 
of Congress. 
1. The Role of the Executive Branch 
In late April 1793, the French naval vessel L’Embuscade captured a British 
vessel, The Grange, within the Bay of Delaware.77  Under accepted principles 
of the law of nations, there was no question “that to attack an enemy in a 
neutral territory is absolutely unlawful.”78  Hence, the capture of The Grange 
raised two questions.  As a factual matter, where did the capture occur?  And 
 
 76. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 16. 
 77. See Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 31–35; Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas 
Jefferson (May 27, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 149, 150. 
 78. See Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on the Grange (May 14, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 32. 
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as a legal matter, what were the boundaries of U.S. territorial waters?  After 
investigating and analyzing these issues, Attorney General Randolph 
concluded that the capture occurred in U.S. territorial waters (i.e., neutral 
territory), and that “the duty arising from the illegal act[] is restitution.”79  In 
deference to that judgment, Genet agreed that The Grange would be returned 
to its British owners.80 
The Grange was one of the few cases, though, where the Executive Branch 
performed the adjudicative function of deciding that the capture of a specific 
vessel was unlawful.  After the United States resolved the case of The Grange, 
it soon became apparent that there would be many such cases to resolve, and 
the Executive grew uncomfortable with repeated demands from the French and 
British Ambassadors, asking the Executive to perform what it believed was an 
adjudicative function.  Within a period of a few days in June 1793, Secretary 
of State Jefferson received formal protests from the British concerning The 
Catharine and from the French concerning The William.  These protests forced 
the Cabinet to reconsider the respective roles of the Executive and Judicial 
Branches in handling these disputes. 
First, on June 11, 1793, George Hammond, Great Britain’s Ambassador to 
the United States, wrote to Thomas Jefferson to protest the seizure by French 
captors of the British brigantine Catharine within the territorial waters of the 
United States.81  Hammond requested “immediate restitution of this vessel” on 
the grounds that the seizure was “an aggression on the territory and jurisdiction 
of the United States.”82  The Cabinet met the next day to formulate a U.S. 
response.  They reached a unanimous agreement that the matter should be 
resolved by judicial means.83  Jefferson wrote to Hammond to convey the U.S. 
views.  Jefferson asked Hammond “to have the parties interested apprised 
without delay that they are to take measures as in ordinary civil cases for the 
support of their rights judicially.”84  The letter continued: 
Should the decision be in favor of the jurisdiction of the court, it will follow 
that all future similar cases will devolve at once on the individuals interested to 
be taken care of by themselves, as in other questions of private property 
provided for by the laws. . . . This train of things is much more desireable for 
 
 79. Id. at 35. 
 80. See Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1793), in 1 
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 149, 150. 
 81. Memorial from George Hammond (June 11, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 253. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Cabinet Opinions on the Republican and the Catharine (June 12, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 259–60. 
 84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (June 13, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 270. 
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the Executive, whose functions are not analogous to the questions of law and 
fact produced by these cases . . . .85 
Two points are noteworthy.  First, the Executive Branch preferred for the 
courts to resolve these cases because the cases involved private property rights 
and the application of law to fact.  Second, it was the judiciary’s responsibility 
to decide whether these were matters within the jurisdiction of federal 
admiralty courts.86 
Jefferson sent this letter to Hammond on June 13.  Then, on June 14, 
Ambassador Genet wrote to Jefferson to protest the seizure of The William by 
U.S. judicial officers: “You will see by the papers hereto annexed, that, in 
contempt of the treaties which unite the French and Americans; that in 
contempt of the law of nations; civil and judiciary officers of the United States 
have permitted themselves” to seize prizes captured by French privateers.87  
Genet added:  “I hope to obtain immediately . . . restitution, with damages and 
interest, of the French prizes arrested and seized at Philadelphia, by an 
incompetent judge . . . .”88  Genet also made clear that France believed these 
types of disputes should be resolved through diplomatic means, not through 
private adjudication.  He wrote: “It is through the intervention of the public 
ministers, that affairs of the nature which produce my present complaints and 
reclamations, ought to be treated.”89  This was consistent with France’s 
litigating position in these cases, which emphasized that disputes related to 
French privateers were, first and foremost, disputes involving sovereign 
rights.90 
 
 85. Id. at 270–71. 
 86. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 704. 
 87. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 152. 
 88. Id.  The events preceding Genet’s letter to Jefferson merit brief comment.  In the spring 
of 1793, the French privateer Citizen Genet captured a British ship, The William, and brought it to 
Philadelphia.  The British owners filed an in rem action in federal court, alleging that the capture 
was illegal because the ship was seized in U.S. territorial waters.  Findlay v. The William, 9 F. 
Cas. 57 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790).  Meanwhile, on June 7, 1793, an agent for the French captors 
proceeded to sell the cargo at a wharf in Philadelphia.  Statement of Francis Dupont (June 7, 
1793), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 152.  In an effort to establish the court’s jurisdiction over 
the ship and its cargo, “a deputy marshal of the court of admiralty” attempted to halt the sale of 
the cargo.  Id.  The agent for the French captors believed “that the admiralty could not . . . meddle 
in this business, agreeably to the 17th article of the treaty of commerce between France and the 
United States.”  Id.  The agent proceeded to sell the cargo, but it allegedly sold below market 
value because the deputy marshal “discouraged the bidders, and even suspended their bidding.”  
Id. 
 89. Letter from Edmond Charles Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 152. 
 90. See infra notes 146–55 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
164 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:145 
Jefferson drafted a letter in response to Genet’s protest, which included the 
following passage: 
The functions of the Executive are not competent to the decision of Questions 
of property between Individuals.  These are ascribed to the Judiciary 
alone . . . . You will therefore be sensible, Sir, that though the President is not 
the Organ for doing what is just in the present case, it will be effectually done 
by those to whom the constitution has ascribed that duty; and be assured that 
the interests, the rights and the dignity of the French nation will receive within 
the Bosom of the United States all the support which a friendly nation could 
desire, and a neutral one yield.91 
Jefferson did not send the letter in this form,92 but his draft identifies an 
important element of the consensus position that later emerged.  Even though 
the French privateering cases implicated “the interests, the rights and the 
dignity of the French nation,” the judiciary had the constitutional responsibility 
for vindicating France’s interests, because the cases also involved “Questions 
of property between Individuals.” 
On June 21, one week after Genet wrote to Jefferson, Judge Richard 
Peters, the federal district judge in Philadelphia, ruled that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction in the case of The William.93  Jefferson sent his reply to 
Genet after the district court issued its ruling.  In that letter, Jefferson told 
Genet: 
The persons who reclaimed the ship William as taken within the limits of the 
protection of the United States, having thought proper to carry their claim first 
into the courts of admiralty, there was no power in this country which could 
take the vessel out of the custody of that court, till it should decide, itself, 
whether it had jurisdiction or not of the cause . . . .94 
Jefferson’s reply is noteworthy for two reasons.  First, if an individual files an 
in rem action in an admiralty court, and the court seizes a vessel on that basis, 
the Executive has no power to order the court to release the vessel, 
notwithstanding French protests that the seizure violates U.S. treaty obligations 
owed to France.  Second, questions about the jurisdiction of U.S. courts were 
matters to be decided by the Judicial Branch, without interference from the 
Executive Branch.95 
 
 91. Draft Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 17, 1793), in 26 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 301–02. 
 92. See id. at 302. 
 93. The William, 9 F. Cas. at 61–62. 
 94. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (June 29, 1793), in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 161. 
 95. This, of course, assumes that Congress has not exercised its legislative power to clarify 
the scope of federal court jurisdiction. 
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2. Early Decisions by Lower Courts 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Sloop Betsey, the lower courts 
generally held that they lacked jurisdiction to entertain claims by ship owners 
who alleged that their vessels had been seized unlawfully by French privateers.  
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Sloop Betsey that the lower courts did 
have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.  However, the Supreme Court 
provided virtually no rationale for its decision.  Hence, to understand the 
Supreme Court decision in Sloop Betsey, it is helpful first to examine the prior 
lower court decisions.  Published documents contain fairly detailed 
information about four district court cases decided before the Supreme Court 
decision in Sloop Betsey.  The federal district court in Pennsylvania decided 
Findlay v. The William96 and Moxon v. The Fanny,97 both of which are 
published in the “federal cases” collection.  The district court in New York 
decided Meade v. The Brigantine Catharine, which was published 
contemporaneously as a stand-alone volume.98  Finally, the Maryland District 
Court’s opinion in Sloop Betsey is reproduced in The Documentary History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States.99  This section analyzes these four 
district court opinions. 
All four cases originated when French privateers captured merchant 
vessels and brought them into U.S. ports.  The William, The Fanny, and The 
Catharine were British vessels, and were thus enemy property.  The libellants 
in those cases alleged, inter alia, that the captures were unlawful because the 
ships were seized in neutral territory, specifically, in U.S. territorial waters.  
The Betsey was a Swedish vessel.100  The libellants in that case alleged that the 
capture was unlawful because Sweden was a neutral country.  The substantive 
law governing these claims was undisputed: it was clearly illegal under the law 
of nations to capture a neutral vessel or to capture an enemy vessel in neutral 
territory.  The main dispute in all four cases revolved around the question 
whether U.S. admiralty courts had jurisdiction to entertain the claims.  In all 
four cases, the district courts concluded that they lacked jurisdiction. 
 
 96. 9 F. Cas. at 57. 
 97. 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895). 
 98. DECREE ON THE ADMIRALTY SIDE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF NEW YORK, IN WHICH 
THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NEUTRALITY CONCERNING CAPTURES WITHIN NEUTRAL 
BOUNDS; AND THE TREATY OF AMITY AND COMMERCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED 
STATES, AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE NEUTRAL COURTS, AS FAR AS THEY ARE RESPECTIVELY 
CONNECTED WITH THAT SUBJECT ARE CONSIDERED (1794) [hereinafter The Catharine] (copy on 
file with author) (publishing the decision in Meade v. The Brigantine Catharine).  All page 
references for The Catharine refer to the author’s copy. 
 99. See 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 324–32. 
 100. The French captors alleged that The Betsey was British property, and hence subject to 
seizure as enemy property.  See Plea to the Jurisdiction, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 320–21. 
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The French captors raised four main objections to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by U.S. courts.101  First, they argued “[t]hat, by the laws of nations 
. . . a neutral nation has no right to be the judge, either of the lawfulness of the 
war between belligerent powers, or of their conduct towards each other in the 
prosecution of hostilities.”102  Accordingly, under the law of nations, “the 
courts of the nation to which the captor belongs” have exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide whether a captured vessel is a lawful prize.103  The district courts in The 
William, The Fanny, and Sloop Betsey all accepted this argument, and agreed 
that the law of nations precluded the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts.104 
Second, the French captors invoked Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty between 
the United States and France as a bar to jurisdiction.  The Treaty stipulates: 
It shall be lawful for the ships of war of either party, and privateers, freely to 
carry whithersoever they please, the ships and goods taken from their 
enemies . . . nor shall such prizes be arrested or seized when they come to and 
enter the ports of either party; nor shall the . . . officers of those places . . . 
make examination concerning the lawfulness of such prizes . . . .105 
The Treaty appears to bar in rem jurisdiction over the prizes (“nor shall such 
prizes be arrested or seized”), as well as subject matter jurisdiction over the 
dispute (precluding officers from making “examination concerning the 
lawfulness of such prizes”).  Hence, the French captors relied heavily on 
Article 17 to support their arguments against the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.106  
However, of the four district court decisions under review here, The Fanny was 
the only case in which the court gave much weight to the treaty argument to 
support its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction.107  In contrast, the district 
court in The Catharine expressly rejected the French interpretation of the 
 
 101. The French refused to participate in judicial proceedings in The Catharine.  See The 
Catharine, supra note 98, at 4.  Hence, the summary of arguments adduced by French captors is 
based on the other three cases. 
 102. Findlay v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57, 58 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4790). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 61 (“[A]ffairs of prizes are only cognizable in the courts of the power making 
the capture . . . .”); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 946 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (“Neutral 
courts . . . are not clothed with authority to vindicate or carry on national contests . . . .”); Sloop 
Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 325 (“[Q]uestions relative to such captures, as prize, can 
only be determined by the admiralty-courts belonging to that power, whose subjects make the 
capture.”). 
 105. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII. 
 106. See The William, 9 F. Cas. at 58; The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 944 (contending “that the 
treaty forbids the courts from interfering”); Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 321 
(quoting the Treaty and arguing “that the said prize ought not to be arrested or seized or the 
lawfulness of the said prize enquired into by the United States or any of its Courts of Justice”). 
 107. See The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 947 (“The treaty with France . . . insisted on by the 
captors . . . has its due weight with me; but only in cases evidently comprehended in it.  And it 
appears to me that this case is one of them . . . .”). 
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Treaty, concluding that the word “prizes” in Article 17 refers only “to captures 
on the high seas, according to the rights of war,” and not to captures in neutral 
territory.108 
In addition to arguments based on the law of nations and the Treaty with 
France, the French captors also argued, in effect, that the ship owners were not 
the proper plaintiffs to bring these claims.  In their view, the allegation that a 
seizure occurred in neutral territory, if true, “did not give rights to [private] 
parties at war, but merely affected the neutral nation.”109  Therefore, “the 
parties libellants . . . had no power to sue and recover on the point of violation 
of territory.”110  The district courts in The Fanny and The Catharine agreed 
with this argument: “I can find no sufficient reason for reducing the violation 
of a territory to the level of a private injury against an individual who has 
incidentally suffered a wrong.  The offence consists in the affront to the state, 
by an attack upon its sovereignty . . . .”111 
Finally, the French captors argued that separation of powers considerations 
precluded the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts.  For example, in The 
William, the French captors contended that any infringement of the territorial 
sovereignty of a neutral party “must be canvassed by the diplomatic body, and 
finally settled by the sovereigns,” but it could not be the subject of a “judiciary 
enquiry.”112  In The William, The Fanny, The Catharine, and Sloop Betsey, the 
district judges all agreed that “complaints of this kind . . . must be preferred to 
the executive power of the United States, and not to the admiralty-courts.”113  
However, in Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court rejected this 
conclusion. 
3. The Supreme Court 
In Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, the French appellees raised many of the same 
objections to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts that had been raised in the district 
courts in The William, The Fanny, The Catharine, and Sloop Betsey.114  They 
also raised one other objection: they argued that there was no federal statute 
that conferred jurisdiction on the federal district court.  Section 9 of the 1789 
 
 108. See The Catharine, supra note 98, at 13–19. 
 109. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 944. 
 110. Id. 
 111. The Catharine, supra note 98, at 30; accord The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 946. 
 112. The William, 9 F. Cas. at 58; see also The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. at 944 (acknowledging “that 
a capture in a neutral territory was an offense to the neutral . . . [b]ut this is a matter of state 
policy, not of judicial proceeding”). 
 113. Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 332; accord The William, 9 F. Cas. at 61 
(“[W]hen two powers have any difference between them, the affair must be treated by 
negotiation, and not through the instrumentality of their courts of justice.”); The Fanny, 17 F. 
Cas. at 946–47; The Catharine, supra note 98, at 19–35. 
 114. See Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 7–12 (1794). 
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Judiciary Act granted federal district courts “exclusive original cognizance of 
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”115  The appellees 
argued that a prize case is not a “civil cause” within the meaning of the statute 
because prize cases arise in wartime, not peace time.116  The appellants replied 
that the term “civil” in the statute “is used . . . in contra-distinction to 
criminal,” and that maritime captures during wartime are “civil causes” within 
the meaning of the statute because they are not criminal cases.117  The Supreme 
Court agreed with the appellants on this point, holding expressly that “every 
District Court in the United States, possesses all the powers of a court of 
Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court.”118 
Like the French captors in the courts below, the French appellees in Sloop 
Betsey contended: (1) that the libellants’ allegations should be addressed 
through diplomatic channels, not by adjudication in U.S. courts;119 (2) “[t]hat 
by the law of nations, the courts of the captor can alone determine the question 
of prize, or no prize”;120 and (3) that “[t]he interference of the American courts 
will be a manifest violation of the 17th article of the treaty with France.”121  
The Supreme Court did not rule expressly on any of these arguments.  Even so, 
the Court did hold expressly “that the District Court of Maryland . . . has 
jurisdiction competent to enquire, and to decide, whether, in the present case, 
restitution ought to be made to the claimants.”122  In so holding, the Court 
implicitly rejected all three of the aforementioned arguments against 
jurisdiction.  Thus, to understand the reasoning behind the Court’s decision, it 
is helpful to consider the appellants’ reply to each of these three points. 
First, the appellants noted that Article 17 of the Treaty, by its terms, 
applies only to “the ships and goods taken from their enemies.”123  Therefore, 
they argued, “being in the affirmative, as to enemies, it affords a strong 
implication of a negative as to neutrals.”124  In other words, assuming that 
Article 17 limits the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the limitation does not apply to 
cases, like Sloop Betsey, where the libellants claim that the captured vessel is 
 
 115. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. 
 116. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 7–8. 
 117. See id. at 12–13 (emphasis omitted). 
 118. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
 119. Id. at 8–9. 
 120. Id. at 9. 
 121. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 11.  The French appellees added: “To decide in opposition to a 
compact, so unequivocal and unambiguous, would endanger the national tranquility, by giving a 
just and honorable cause of war to the French Republic.”  Id. at 11–12 (emphasis omitted).  This 
statement proved to be prophetic, because French allegations that the United States repeatedly 
violated Article 17 ultimately became a key factor that led to the so-called “quasi-war” between 
the United States and France.  See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 122. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
 123. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII. 
 124. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 12. 
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neutral property.  In such cases, the district court can exercise jurisdiction at 
least for the limited purpose of determining whether the captured vessel 
belongs to a neutral country or a nation at war with France.  By holding that 
the district court had jurisdiction in Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court implicitly 
accepted this argument.  Strictly speaking, though, the Court’s decision in 
Sloop Betsey did not address the treaty-based objection to jurisdiction in cases 
like The William, The Fanny, and The Catharine, where the libellants alleged 
that the privateers seized enemy property in U.S. territorial waters.125 
Second, the appellants effectively conceded that, under the law of nations, 
the prize courts of the captor’s nation have exclusive jurisdiction to condemn a 
captured vessel as a lawful prize.  Nevertheless, the libellants had argued in the 
district court that although “the power to condemn belongs properly to the 
nation of the captor . . . the case before the court is not of a libel to condemn, 
but of a libel for acquittal and restitution; and . . . the courts of a neutral nation 
may sustain such a libel.”126  In other words, under the law of nations, the 
courts of a neutral nation cannot exercise jurisdiction over a prize case filed by 
a privateer who seeks a judgment that the captured vessel is a lawful prize, but 
they can exercise jurisdiction over a marine trespass case filed by the owner of 
a captured vessel who seeks restitution of the captured property.127  By holding 
that the district court had jurisdiction in Sloop Betsey, the Supreme Court 
implicitly accepted this argument.128  In contrast to the treaty argument 
discussed above, this argument applies equally to cases in which a libellant 
alleges that a privateer captured enemy property in neutral territory.129 
 
 125. In a letter to Gouverneur Morris, then the U.S. Ambassador to France, Jefferson 
contended that Article 17 applied only to captures of enemy vessels on the high seas.  See Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 702–04.  If Jefferson was right, then enemy vessels in U.S. 
territorial waters, like neutral vessels, would be outside the scope of Article 17. 
 126. Sloop Betsey, in 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 328 (emphasis omitted). 
 127. The presentation of appellants’ argument on this point by the Supreme Court reporter, 
Alexander Dallas, is not as lucid as it might have been, but Dallas’ report of the case does show 
that they made this argument.  See Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 15. 
 128. The Court’s opinion states “that every District Court in the United States, possesses all 
the powers of a court of Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court.”  Id. at 
16 (emphasis omitted).  In adjudicating a marine trespass case, like Sloop Betsey, the district court 
was sitting as an instance court to decide, as the appellants stated, the question of “[r]estitution or 
no restitution.”  Id. at 6.  However, the implication of the Supreme Court’s statement is that, once 
convened as an instance court, the district court also has the jurisdiction “to try every incidental 
question,” id. at 6, including the question of whether the seizure of the vessel was legal under the 
law of nations (which would ordinarily be tried in a prize court). 
 129. Professor Casto contends that the Supreme Court’s resolution of this issue was 
inconsistent with “settled legal doctrine.”  See CASTO, supra note 75, at 85.  Granted, there was 
an established rule under the law of nations that the question of “prize or no prize” was to be 
decided by the courts of the captor’s nation.  However, as Jefferson noted six months before the 
Court decided Sloop Betsey, the law of nations also obligated the United States to extend its 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
170 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:145 
Finally, the appellants devoted most of their argument to showing that, 
under the U.S. Constitution, the Judicial Branch, not the Executive Branch, is 
responsible for adjudicating cases like Sloop Betsey.  The appellees argued that 
the alleged injury “is an attack upon the sovereignty of Sweden,” and that 
therefore the individual libellants must seek redress from the sovereign.130  The 
appellants replied as follows: 
[T]he Legislative, Judicial, and Executive powers . . . in the contemplation of 
our Constitution, are each a branch of the sovereignty. . . . The Constitution 
designates the portion of sovereignty to be exercised by the Judicial 
department; and . . . renders it sovereign, as to determinations upon property, 
whenever the property is within its reach. . . . To the Judicial, and not to the 
Executive, department, the citizen, or subject, naturally looks for 
determinations upon his property . . . .131 
By holding that the district court had jurisdiction in Sloop Betsey, the Supreme 
Court endorsed the view that the wartime capture of private property 
implicated not only sovereign rights, but also private rights, and that disputes 
about private rights were properly directed to the judiciary, not the Executive 
Branch.132 
The Court’s decision in Sloop Betsey could be interpreted narrowly to 
mean only that federal district courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases in 
which libellants allege the capture of a neutral vessel.  However, as discussed 
below, the courts subsequently interpreted Sloop Betsey to mean that federal 
district courts had jurisdiction to entertain all claims of illegal seizures by 
French privateers.  Hence, Sloop Betsey was significant because it enabled 
France’s enemies to utilize the U.S. judicial system to file in rem actions 
alleging unlawful captures by French privateers.  When ship owners filed in 
rem actions, the courts would seize the captured vessels and force the 
 
protection to foreign vessels in U.S. waters.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur 
Morris (Aug. 16, 1793), in 26 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 39, at 697, 703–
04.  In effect, the Court decided in Sloop Betsey that the U.S. obligation under the law of nations 
to protect neutral shipping took precedence over the rule that would otherwise have barred the 
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.  This decision was consistent with the position adopted by the U.S. 
Executive Branch.  In this author’s view, the Court’s decision was a reasonable way to reconcile 
two conflicting rules of international law, although it would have been preferable if the Court had 
explained its rationale. 
 130. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. at 8–9 (emphasis omitted). 
 131. Id. at 13–14. 
 132. In several of the French privateer cases, the privateers detained the captain and crew of 
the captured vessels as prisoners.  The appellants in Sloop Betsey argued that the necessity to 
decide on the detention of prisoners was another reason why the case should be resolved by the 
judiciary, not the Executive Branch.  See id. at 14 (“And shall even American citizens be detained 
prisoners in our own harbours, depending for their liberty upon the will of a secretary of state?”).  
It is unclear whether, and to what extent, the Supreme Court may have been swayed by this 
argument. 
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privateers to defend their property claims in court, thereby disrupting the 
privateers’ naval warfare activities.  In sum, when the French attempted to gain 
a tactical military advantage by extending the battlefield to U.S. ports, their 
enemies responded by forcing France to fight the war in U.S. courts.  By 
holding that the Judicial Branch, not the Executive Branch, was the proper 
forum for the resolution of these disputes, the Supreme Court facilitated the 
implementation of this strategy by France’s enemies. 
4. The Role of Congress 
The Court held explicitly in Sloop Betsey that federal district courts had 
jurisdiction over claims involving captures of neutral vessels.  The decision 
also implied that courts had jurisdiction over claims involving captures in U.S. 
territorial waters.  To remove any possible ambiguity on that point, Congress 
enacted legislation in June 1794 stipulating “[t]hat the district courts shall take 
cognizance of complaints by whomsoever instituted, in cases of captures made 
within the waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts 
or shores thereof.”133  With this legislation, Congress endorsed the view, 
already adopted by the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch, that the 
federal courts were a proper forum for resolving claims by individual ship 
owners that their ships had been captured unlawfully by French privateers. 
III.  EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAWFARE: FROM JUNE 1794 TO FEBRUARY 1797 
After Congress enacted the June 1794 legislation, there was a distinct 
change in the nature of the claims raised by ship owners who challenged the 
legality of captures made by French privateers.  Before June 1794, the ship 
owners generally alleged that the privateers had violated the law of nations by 
capturing a neutral vessel or by making a capture in U.S. territorial waters.  
After June 1794, the ship owners generally alleged that the privateers had 
violated federal statutes by outfitting their vessels in U.S. ports or by recruiting 
U.S. citizens as crew members.  Although the June 1794 legislation prohibited 
outfitting of privateers in U.S. ports and recruitment of U.S. citizens,134 it did 
not authorize private lawsuits to enforce those rules, nor did it explicitly 
authorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over such claims.  Moreover, it 
is debatable whether the French privateers were violating the law of nations by 
recruiting U.S. citizens or by outfitting their ships in U.S. ports.135 
Part III examines the U.S. response to this second wave of French 
privateering cases in the period from June 1794 to February 1797, when the 
Supreme Court decided the last French privateering case.136  During this 
 
 133. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 6, 1 Stat. 381, 384. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See infra notes 215–26 and accompanying text. 
 136. Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797). 
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period, the Supreme Court decided twenty-three cases related to French 
privateering activities in the United States.137  To appreciate fully the 
significance of those cases, it is necessary to view them simultaneously from 
three different angles.  First, the privateering cases involved disputes between 
private parties over ownership of private property.  Second, the cases involved 
an ongoing diplomatic dispute between the United States and France over the 
proper interpretation and application of Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with 
France.  Third, the cases involved a tactical ploy by Great Britain and other 
enemies of France to utilize the U.S. judicial system to harass French 
privateers and to undermine France’s naval warfare strategy (which relied 
heavily on the use of privateers). 
The distribution of decision-making responsibility during this period can 
be summarized briefly as follows.  The federal judiciary was the primary 
decision maker with respect to the major issues raised by the French 
privateering cases.  The Executive Branch performed two main functions 
during this period: it listened to French grievances when French diplomats 
complained that U.S. courts were violating Article 17; and it explained U.S. 
judicial decisions to French diplomats in an attempt to justify those decisions.  
Meanwhile, Congress did not enact any significant legislation related to French 
privateering between June 1794 and February 1797.  This division of decision-
making responsibility stemmed, in part, from a failure to view the cases from 
all three angles mentioned above.  The U.S. government viewed the cases 
primarily as disputes about private property; that is why the judiciary took the 
lead role in resolving the cases.  The Executive Branch was well aware of 
French grievances about violations of Article 17, but the Executive trusted the 
judiciary to address those grievances in the ordinary course of litigation. 
The analysis suggests that judicial decision making in the privateering 
cases was a key factor that contributed to the deterioration of U.S. diplomatic 
relations with France.  France became increasingly agitated by judicial 
decisions that, in its view, not only violated Article 17, but also interfered with 
France’s naval strategy by disrupting the activities of French privateers.  
Moreover, France was exasperated by the Executive’s refusal to intervene in 
ongoing judicial proceedings.  By the end of 1796, France had initiated a series 
of measures—intended partly to retaliate against the United States for alleged 
violations of Article 17—that ultimately led to the outbreak of the so-called 
“quasi-war” between the United States and France.138 
 
 137. See infra Part III.B (presenting an overview of the cases). 
 138. It is clear from the diplomatic correspondence of the era that France’s allegation that the 
United States repeatedly violated Article 17 was one of the key French grievances that led to the 
quasi-war.  See, e.g., Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 579–83; Letter from Charles De la Croix to James Monroe (Dec. 11, 
1796), in 1 ASPFR, supra note 18, at 746–47.  However, the leading history of the quasi-war, in 
providing a summary of French grievances, curiously omits any reference to the alleged U.S. 
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The analysis in Part III is divided into four sections.  The first section 
explains how France’s enemies utilized the U.S. judicial system to thwart 
France’s naval warfare strategy.  The second section provides an overview of 
the privateering cases decided by the Supreme Court during this period.  The 
third section provides case studies of two cases to show how judicial decisions 
in the privateering cases became a primary focus of U.S. diplomacy with 
France.  The final section contends that judicial decision making by U.S. courts 
was one of three key factors that ultimately persuaded French privateers to stop 
bringing their prizes to U.S. ports. 
A. Litigation as a Means of Warfare 
In March 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations defined “lawfare” as “a 
strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means 
to achieve military objectives.”139  The report described lawfare as a “new 
phenomenon” and warned of associated dangers.140  In fact, lawfare is not a 
new phenomenon.  In the period from 1794 to 1797, Great Britain (and to a 
lesser extent France’s other enemies) successfully utilized a lawfare strategy to 
counter the military maneuvers of French privateers who were using American 
ports as a base of operations for naval warfare. 
Between June 1794 and February 1797, the Supreme Court decided 
thirteen cases in which British consuls filed in rem suits seeking restitution of 
British merchant vessels captured by French privateers.141  The British consuls 
 
treaty violations.  See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY 
OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801, at 9–10 (1966). 
 139. Council on Foreign Relations, Lawfare: The Latest in Asymmetries (Mar. 18, 2003), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5772. 
 140. Id. 
 141. These thirteen cases include four published decisions and nine unpublished decisions.  
The published decisions are: Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796); 
Moodie v. The Ship Alfred, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796); Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 
(1796); and Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796).  The unpublished 
decisions are: Wallace v. The Brig Caesar (No. 11), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 17), microformed 
on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Eliza 
(Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm 
Publications); Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20), microformed on Appellate 
Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The Brig Favorite (No. 22), 
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications); Moodie v. The 
Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm 
Publications); Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); and Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), 
microformed on Appellate Case Files (National Archives Microfilm Publications).  For further 
discussion, see infra notes 162–79 and accompanying text. 
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lost twelve of those thirteen cases.142  Even so, Benjamin Moodie, the British 
consul in South Carolina who filed eleven of the thirteen cases, was quite 
satisfied with the results.  Since these were in rem actions, the courts typically 
retained custody of the captured property (or the funds from the sale of the 
property) for twelve to eighteen months while judicial proceedings were 
pending.143  Thus, by filing in rem actions in U.S. district courts, and then 
filing appeals in the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, the libellants 
successfully detained the privateers’ property for extended periods of time and 
made it difficult for the privateers to initiate additional attacks on enemy 
merchant vessels.144  Hence, in April 1796, when most of these cases were 
pending before the Supreme Court, Moodie wrote that he was “fully convinced 
that the detention of such considerable Sums during the Proceedings in the 
different Courts has had as much if not greater effect in saving British Property 
than even the Success of his Majesty’s Cruizers.”145 
French diplomats understood the British lawfare strategy and its 
consequences for French privateering.  They protested vehemently that the 
United States was undermining France’s war effort by allowing U.S. courts to 
seize the assets of French privateers.  Thus, for example, the French 
Ambassador, Pierre Adet, wrote a lengthy diatribe to the U.S. Secretary of 
State, Timothy Pickering, which included the following statement: 
[W]hen the Powers at war with the republic had the privilege . . . of causing to 
be arrested the privateers and their prizes, of detaining them in the ports of the 
United States, of ruining them by considerable costs, by the excessive 
expenses which they occasioned them, they drew from that privilege an 
immense advantage to the detriment of France[.]  Doubtless, it was of little 
import to them that sometimes the privateers obtained justice, in the last resort, 
if they detained the privateer for a length of time, and if they, by that means, 
sheltered from their pursuit the commerce of the enemy of France.146 
 
 142. The one exception was Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. 302 (1796). 
 143. See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
 144. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), Justice Jackson wrote: “It would be 
difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he 
is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his 
efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”  Id. at 
779.  This is effectively what the British consuls accomplished by forcing French privateers to 
defend admiralty actions in U.S. courts.  The commanders of French privateering vessels were 
forced to remain on land to handle legal proceedings.  Moreover, since the courts typically 
detained the proceeds from the sale of prizes while the suits were pending, the commanders may 
not have had adequate funds to pay their crews until the courts agreed to release the funds. 
 145. Letter from Benjamin Moodie to Phineas Bond (Apr. 23, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 
8, at 128–29. 
 146. Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 579, 580. 
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It is noteworthy that Ambassador Adet wrote this letter in November 1796.  
During the February and August sessions in 1796, the Supreme Court decided 
sixteen cases in which ship owners or their agents filed in rem suits seeking 
restitution of enemy merchant vessels captured by French privateers.147  The 
French privateers won fifteen of the sixteen cases on the grounds that Article 
17 of the 1778 Treaty with France barred the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. 
courts.148  Thus, Adet’s protest came on the heels of what could be viewed as a 
remarkably pro-French set of decisions by the Supreme Court.  Even so, 
France alleged that U.S. courts were violating Article 17 by exercising 
jurisdiction, even temporarily, before they ultimately dismissed the libels for 
lack of jurisdiction.149  Thus, for example, in the same November 1796 letter, 
Adet wrote “[t]hat the 17th article of the treaty of 1778, has been violated; that, 
in contempt of this article, the American tribunals have been permitted to take 
cognizance of the validity of prizes made by French ships of war and 
privateers.”150  In sum, from France’s perspective, U.S. courts were violating 
treaty obligations owed to France and thwarting France’s military strategy by 
disrupting the naval warfare activities of French privateers. 
When French diplomats lodged their complaints with senior U.S. executive 
officials, seeking diplomatic solutions for foreign affairs controversies, U.S. 
executive officials told the French diplomats that the federal judiciary was the 
branch of government responsible for deciding these issues.  For example, in 
June 1795, French Ambassador Fauchet (Adet’s predecessor) wrote to 
Secretary of State Randolph (Pickering’s predecessor), presenting a litany of 
complaints related to French privateers.151  In particular, Fauchet complained 
that U.S. courts detained valid French prizes based on the mere allegation that 
that they had been captured illegally.152  To address this problem, he suggested 
that, before judicial proceedings could commence, there should be prior 
“intervention of the Executive upon the simple question—is there ground for 
prosecution or not?”153  Secretary Randolph replied as follows: 
 
 147. This figure of sixteen cases includes the thirteen cases cited supra note 141.  
Additionally, this figure includes two published decisions—Arcambal v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 306 (1796), and Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796)—as well as one unpublished 
decision: Pintado v. The Ship San Joseph (No. 32), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications). 
 148. The one exception was Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1796). 
 149. For a legal analysis of Article 17, as applied to these cases, see infra Part III.C.1. 
 150. Letter from Pierre Auguste Adet to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 15, 1796), in 1 ASPFR, 
supra note 18, at 579, 582. 
 151. See Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (June 8, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 614–17. 
 152. Id. at 614–15. 
 153. Id. at 615. 
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The courts of justice exercise the sovereignty of this country in judiciary 
matters, are supreme in these, and liable neither to control nor opposition from 
any other branch of the Government. . . . 
 . . . . 
  The previous inquiry by the Executive, which you have suggested, could 
only contribute to delay.  For, if the President were even to decide that a prize 
ought not to be prosecuted in our courts, the decision would be treated as an 
intrusion by those courts, and the judicial proceedings would go on 
notwithstanding.  So speak the constitution and the law.154 
This exchange between Fauchet and Randolph was characteristic of the 
diplomatic dialogue between France and the United States in the period under 
study.  From France’s perspective, issues related to French privateering were 
foreign policy issues to be resolved diplomatically between the executives of 
the two countries.  The United States recognized the foreign affairs 
significance of the privateering cases, but it also recognized that the cases 
could legitimately be seen as disputes between private parties involving 
competing claims to ownership of property.  Viewed in this light, cabinet 
officers thought it proper to defer to the judiciary and to allow U.S. courts to 
resolve the disputes without intervention by the Executive Branch.155 
B. An Overview of Supreme Court Cases 
Between June 1794 and February 1797, the Supreme Court decided a total 
of twenty-three cases that are relevant to this study.  The total of twenty-three 
cases includes eighteen cases in which ship owners or their agents filed in rem 
suits seeking restitution of enemy merchant vessels captured by French 
privateers.156  The five cases that do not fit this description are: Del Col v. 
Arnold,157 Hills v. Ross,158 United States v. La Vengeance,159 MacDonogh v. 
 
 154. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (June 13, 1795), in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 617, 618.  Before this letter could be delivered to Fauchet, Adet replaced him as the 
French Ambassador.  Hence, the letter was addressed to Fauchet, but delivered to Adet.  See id. at 
617. 
 155. See, e.g., Letter from William Bradford, Jr. to Edmund Randolph (May 9, 1795), in 7 
DHSC, supra note 8, at 53 (“Being therefore of opinion that the proceedings in these causes have 
been regular, I presume they must wait the usual course of Judicial decision; & that any previous 
interference on the part of the Executive would be improper & unavailing.”). 
 156. See infra notes 162–79.  The term “enemy merchant vessels” refers to vessels belonging 
to France’s enemies: Britain, Spain, and Holland. 
 157. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796).  Del Col involved the capture by a French privateer of an 
American ship, not an enemy ship.  Additionally, the suit was filed as an in personam action, not 
an in rem action, because the prize crew sank the captured vessel.  See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 
625–33. 
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Dannery,160 and United States v. Peters.161  Peters is significant because it 
established an important limitation on the jurisdiction of U.S. courts: they 
could not exercise jurisdiction over private suits alleging unlawful captures 
unless the French captors brought their prizes into U.S. ports.  The other four 
cases are noted for the sake of completeness, but they do not add anything 
significant to our story. 
The eighteen cases in which ship owners or their agents filed in rem suits 
seeking restitution of enemy merchant vessels captured by French privateers 
include eight published decisions and ten unpublished decisions.  The eight 
published decisions are: Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance,162 Moodie v. The 
 
 158. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 331 (1796); 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 184 (1796) (continuing the case to the next 
term).  Hills was an in personam action, not an in rem action, because the French captors sold the 
prize before the ship owners filed suit for damages.  See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 683–93. 
 159. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).  La Vengeance was an enforcement action against a French 
privateer filed by a U.S. Attorney.  The U.S. Attorney sought forfeiture of the vessel, based on 
allegations that the privateer had been illegally outfitted in U.S. territorial waters and had been 
used to export arms and ammunition in violation of a federal statute.  See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, 
at 526–29. 
 160. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188 (1796).  MacDonogh involved a British merchant ship captured by a 
French naval vessel, not a French privateer.  The litigation involved a three-way contest between 
the French captors, the original British owners, and the crew of an American vessel that saved the 
British ship, the Mary Ford, after she had been abandoned by her French captors.  See 7 DHSC, 
supra note 8, at 11–17. 
 161. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795).  In Peters, the commander of a French warship filed a writ 
of prohibition in the Supreme Court to prevent Richard Peters, the district judge for the District of 
Pennsylvania, from exercising jurisdiction over a libel filed in that court by James Yard.  See id. 
at 121–25.  Yard was a U.S. citizen.  In his libel in the district court, Yard alleged that he was the 
owner of the schooner William Lindsey, an American vessel, which had been captured illegally by 
a French warship, the Cassius.  Id. at 121–22.  If the Cassius had brought the William Lindsey to 
Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania district court could have exercised jurisdiction under the principle 
announced in Sloop Betsey.  However, the Cassius took the William Lindsey to Port de Paix, a 
French port in the Caribbean.  When the Cassius subsequently returned to Philadelphia without 
the William Lindsey, Yard filed a libel and moved to attach the Cassius in an effort to secure 
compensation for the damages he sustained as a result of the allegedly illegal capture of his 
schooner.  Id.  Samuel Davis, the commander of the Cassius, responded by filing a writ of 
prohibition in the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the law of 
nations and the Treaty with France precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction in a 
case where a French warship had captured an American vessel and taken the captured vessel to a 
French port.  Id. at 129–32.  For more details on the case, see 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 719–42. 
 162. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797).  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the 
Perseverance, captured by the French privateer the Sans Pareil in July 1794.  The libellant, 
Thomas Jennings, was the British ship owner.  He filed the libel in the U.S. district court in 
Rhode Island in September 1794.  The district court ruled in favor of the French captors in 
August 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in June 1796, and by the Supreme 
Court in February 1797.  Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 
811–28.  See also infra Part III.C.2. 
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Ship Phoebe Anne,163 Moodie v. The Ship Alfred,164 Arcambal v. Wiseman,165 
Cotton v. Wallace,166 Geyer v. Michel,167 Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart,168 
 
 163. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796).  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the 
Phoebe Anne, captured by the French privateer La Mere Michel in April 1795.  The libellant, 
Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. 
district court in South Carolina in May 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district 
court ruled in favor of the French captors in June 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit 
court in November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information about the case 
is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 189–200; JACKSON, supra note 26, at 142–43; and from 
the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 164. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 307 (1796).  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the 
Alfred, captured by the French privateer Le Brutus in March 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin 
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in 
South Carolina in April 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district court ruled in 
favor of the French captors in May 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in 
October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information about the case is derived 
from JACKSON, supra note 26, at 128–29, and from the author’s research in the Supreme Court 
archives. 
 165. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).  Arcambal v. Wiseman was an in rem action against a 
Spanish vessel, Nuestra Senora del Carmen, captured by the French privateer Le Brutus in the 
summer of 1795.  The libellant, Joseph Wiseman, was the Spanish vice-consul in Rhode Island.  
He filed the action, initially captioned Wiseman v. Nuestra Senora del Carmen, in the U.S. district 
court in Rhode Island in August 1795 on behalf of the Spanish ship owners.  Two claimants 
contested the libel.  Jean Gariscan, commander of Le Brutus, claimed ownership by capture, and 
Louis Arcambal, the French vice-consul, sought recovery for France.  The district court ruled 
against the Spanish owners in May 1796.  Since the vessel and cargo had been sold at auction, the 
court ordered the proceeds from the sale (held in the court’s custody) to be divided between 
Gariscan and Arcambal.  Wiseman appealed the dismissal of his libel, and Arcambal appealed the 
order concerning distribution of funds to Gariscan.  The circuit court decided both appeals in June 
1796, and the Supreme Court reached its own decision in August 1796.  Both courts affirmed the 
district court order dismissing the Spanish libel, but they reached inconsistent rulings regarding 
the distribution of funds between Gariscan and Arcambal.  Information about the case is derived 
from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 750–60. 
 166. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302 (1796).  Cotton v. Wallace was an in rem action against a British 
vessel, the Brig Everton, captured by the French privateer the Egalite in December 1794.  The 
libellant, John Wallace, was the British consul in Georgia.  He filed the action, initially captioned 
Wallace v. Brig Everton, in the U.S. district court in Georgia in January 1795 on behalf of the 
British ship owners.  The district court ruled in favor of the British owners in March 1795 on the 
grounds that the Egalite had been illegally outfitted in the United States, in violation of U.S. 
neutrality.  John Cotton, one of the officers on the Egalite, appealed that decision to the circuit 
court.  The circuit court affirmed the district court decree in May 1795, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed in March 1796.  However, the Court postponed a decision on damages until the August 
1796 term.  Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 119–32. 
 167. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796).  This was an in rem action against a Dutch vessel, Den 
Onzekeren, captured by the French privateer Le Citoyen de Marseille in November 1794.  The 
libellant, John Geyer, was acting as an agent for the Dutch ship owners.  He filed the action, 
initially captioned Geyer v. Den Onzekeren, in the U.S. district court in South Carolina in 
February 1795.  The district court ruled in favor of the Dutch owners in April 1795 on the 
grounds that the French privateer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port in violation of 
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and Talbot v. Jansen.169  The French privateers lost only two of these eight 
cases: Talbot v. Jansen and Cotton v. Wallace. 
 
U.S. neutrality.  After hearing additional evidence, the circuit court reversed that decree in 
November 1795, ruling in favor of the French captors.  The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit 
Court decree in March 1796.  Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, 
at 133–88.  See also Moodie v. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. 651 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 9742). 
 168. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796).  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Betty 
Cathcart, captured by the French privateer Le Citoyen de Marseille in November 1794.  The 
libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action on 
behalf of the British ship owners in the U.S. district court in South Carolina in January 1795.  The 
district court ruled in favor of the British owners in April 1795 on the grounds that the French 
privateer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port in violation of U.S. neutrality.  On 
appeal to the circuit court, the case was consolidated with Geyer v. Michel because both cases 
involved the same French privateer.  See supra note 167.  After hearing additional evidence, the 
circuit court reversed the district court decree, ruling in favor of the French captors.  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the circuit court decree in March 1796.  Information about the case is derived 
from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 133–88. 
 169. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).  This was an in rem action against a Dutch vessel, the Vrow 
Christina Magdalena, captured in May 1794.  Two privateers flying French flags were jointly 
responsible for the capture: the L’Ami de la Liberte, commanded by Captain Edward Ballard, and 
the L’Ami de la Point-a-Petre, commanded by Captain William Talbot.  See Jansen v. The Vrow 
Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 7216).  When the captors brought the 
Magdalena into Charleston, Joost Jansen, the Dutch master of the Magdalena, filed a libel on 
behalf of the Dutch ship owners seeking restitution of the captured vessel and its cargo.  Jansen 
alleged that the two ships claiming to be French privateers were owned by U.S. citizens, and that 
Ballard and Talbot were both U.S. citizens. See id. at 356–58.  Talbot invoked the law of nations 
and Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France as a bar to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  The 
district court ruled in favor of the Dutch owners in August 1794.  The circuit court affirmed that 
decree in November 1794, and the Supreme Court affirmed in August 1795. 
  Four Supreme Court Justices wrote separate opinions in Talbot: Justice Iredell’s opinion 
provides the clearest statement of the Court’s rationale for rejecting Talbot’s objection to the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  In his view, although Article 17 precludes U.S. courts from making 
“examination concerning the lawfulness of such prizes,” 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, 
art. XVII, the courts must still examine the facts to ascertain whether a case fits within the scope 
of the exemption granted by the Treaty.  Talbot, 3 U.S. at 159.  Moreover, the treaty term 
“privateers” refers only to lawfully commissioned privateers.  Id.  Therefore, the district courts 
must first decide whether a privateer is lawfully commissioned before concluding that Article 17 
precludes them from exercising jurisdiction.  See id.  Information about the case is derived from 6 
DHSC, supra note 10, at 650–718. 
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The ten unpublished decisions are: Moodie v. The Brig Favorite,170 
Wallace v. The Brig Caesar,171 Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid,172 Moodie v. The 
Ship Phyn,173 Moodie v. The Ship Britannia,174 Moodie v. The Brig Eliza 
 
 170. Moodie v. The Brig Favorite (No. 22), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Feb. 29, 1796), reprinted in 
1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 265.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Favorite, 
captured by the French privateer La Parisienne in March 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin Moodie, 
was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in South 
Carolina in March 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district court ruled in favor of 
the French captors in April 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in November 
1795, and by the Supreme Court in February 1796.  Information about the case is derived from 
BEE’S ADMIRALTY REPORTS, supra note 17, at 39; JACKSON, supra note 26, at 136–37; and from 
the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 171. Wallace v. The Brig Caesar (No. 11), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Feb. 29, 1796), reprinted in 
1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 265.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Caesar, 
captured by the French privateer La Parisienne in December 1794.  The libellant, John Wallace, 
was the British consul in Georgia.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in Georgia in 
January 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners. The district court ruled in favor of the French 
captors in February 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in May 1795, and by the 
Supreme Court in February 1796.  Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra 
note 8 , at 53–75. 
 172. Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 17), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Mar. 1, 1796), reprinted in 1 
DHSC, supra note 9, at 265–66.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Mermaid, 
captured by the French privateer General Laveaux in January 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin 
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in 
South Carolina in February 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district court ruled in 
favor of the French captors in April 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in 
October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in March 1796.  Information about the case is derived 
from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 76–118; JACKSON, supra note 26, at 140–41; and from the 
author’s research in the Supreme Court archives.  See also British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F. 
Cas. 169 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1897). 
 173. Moodie v. The Ship Phyn (No. 19), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Mar. 14, 1796), reprinted in 
1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 272.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Phyn, 
captured by the French privateer General Laveaux in January 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin 
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in 
South Carolina in February 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district court ruled in 
favor of the French captors in April 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in 
October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in March 1796.  Information about the case is derived 
from JACKSON, supra note 26, at 142–43, and from the author’s research in the Supreme Court 
archives. 
 174. Moodie v. The Ship Britannia (No. 23), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), reprinted in 1 
DHSC, supra note 9, at 278.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Britannia, 
captured by the French privateer Le Vengeur in June 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was 
the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in South 
Carolina in July 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district court ruled in favor of the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] JUDICIAL FOREIGN POLICY 181 
(Eliza I),175 Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly,176 Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza 
II),177 Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack,178 and Pintado v. The Ship San 
Joseph.179  In all ten cases, the French privateers scored consistent victories in 
the district court, the circuit court, and the Supreme Court. 
 
French captors in September 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in November 
1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information about the case is derived from the 
author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 175. Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza I) (No. 18), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), 
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 278.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the 
Eliza, captured by the French privateers General Laveaux and La Mere Michel in January 1795.  
The libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in 
the U.S. district court in South Carolina in February 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  
The district court ruled in favor of the French captors in April 1795.  That decree was affirmed by 
the circuit court in November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information 
about the case is derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 176. Moodie v. The Brig Tivoly (No. 20), microformed on Appellate Case Files (National 
Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), reprinted in 1 
DHSC, supra note 9, at 278.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the Tivoly, 
captured by the French privateers General Laveaux and La Mere Michel in January 1795.  The 
libellant, Benjamin Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the 
U.S. district court in South Carolina in April 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The 
district court ruled in favor of the French captors in April 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the 
circuit court in October 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information about the 
case is derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 177. Moodie v. The Brig Eliza (Eliza II) (No. 25), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), 
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 278.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the 
Eliza, captured by the French privateer Le Vengeur in September 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin 
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in 
South Carolina in September or October 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district 
court ruled in favor of the French captors in October 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the 
circuit court in November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information about 
the case is derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 178. Moodie v. The Snow Potowmack (No. 24), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 9, 1796), 
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 278.  This was an in rem action against a British vessel, the 
Potowmack, captured by the French privateer Le Vengeur in June 1795.  The libellant, Benjamin 
Moodie, was the British consul in South Carolina.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in 
South Carolina in July 1795 on behalf of the British ship owners.  The district court ruled in favor 
of the French captors in September 1795.  That decree was affirmed by the circuit court in 
November 1795, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  Information about the case is 
derived from the author’s research in the Supreme Court archives. 
 179. Pintado v. The Ship San Joseph (No. 32), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications); see also Supreme Court Minutes (Aug. 10, 1796), 
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 280.  This was an in rem action against a Spanish vessel, 
the San Joseph, captured by the French privateer La Vengeance in May 1795.  The libellant, Don 
Diego Pintado, was the ship owner.  He filed the action in the U.S. district court in New York in 
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Overall, the French privateers prevailed in sixteen of the eighteen cases 
where ship owners or their agents filed in rem suits seeking restitution of 
enemy merchant vessels captured by French privateers.180  In fourteen of those 
cases, the courts at all three levels—district courts, circuit courts, and Supreme 
Court—ruled in favor of the French privateers.181  This point is significant 
because it lends credence to the French allegation that these were frivolous 
lawsuits filed for the purpose of harassing the privateers and thwarting the 
accomplishment of their military objectives.  British consuls were the named 
plaintiffs in thirteen of the eighteen cases,182 and a Spanish vice-consul was the 
named plaintiff in one other case.183  As a formal matter, the consuls were 
merely representing the private interests of merchant ship owners.  However, 
as a practical matter, the active participation of the British consuls also lends 
credence to the French allegation that the British government was pursuing a 
conscious “lawfare” strategy to disrupt the military activities of French 
privateers. 
It is also noteworthy that fourteen of the eighteen cases involved British 
merchant vessels, and the French privateers won thirteen of those fourteen 
cases.184  Assuming that the British strategy was to deny the privateers any 
financial gain from their lawful prizes while the litigation was pending, that 
strategy was quite effective.  The courts retained control of the captured 
property, or the money obtained from the sale of that property, until there was 
a final disposition of the cases by the Supreme Court.185  In descending order, 
the time lag between the initial libel and final disposition by the Supreme 
Court in the thirteen British cases where the privateers prevailed was as 
follows: Perseverance (29 months), Eliza I (18 months), Tivoly (16 months), 
Alfred (16 months), Phoebe Anne (15 months), Betty Cathcart (14 months), 
 
July 1795.  The district court ruled in favor of the French captors in December 1795.  That decree 
was affirmed by the circuit court in April 1796, and by the Supreme Court in August 1796.  
Information about the case is derived from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 524–54.  See also United 
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).  The private action initiated by Don Diego 
Pintado and the government enforcement action against La Vengeance were litigated in tandem. 
 180. See supra notes 162–79. 
 181. In both Geyer v. Michel and Moodie v. The Ship Betty Cathcart, the district court ruled 
against the French privateers, but the circuit court reversed that ruling, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed a judgment in favor of the privateers.  See supra notes 167–68; see also Geyer v. 
Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796). 
 182. These thirteen cases include the eleven “Moodie” cases cited in the preceding 
paragraphs, as well as Wallace v. Brig Caesar and Cotton v. Wallace. 
 183. See supra note 165; see also Arcambal v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). 
 184. The British won Cotton v. Wallace.  See supra note 166. 
 185. In suits initiated by private parties, the courts seized captured prizes, but they never 
asserted control over the French privateering vessels.  However, in enforcement actions initiated 
by the government, the courts would seize French privateering vessels.  See, e.g., United States v. 
La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] JUDICIAL FOREIGN POLICY 183 
Britannia (13 months), Potowmack (13 months), Phyn (13 months), Mermaid 
(13 months), Caesar (13 months), Eliza II (11 months), and Favorite (11 
months).186 
Finally, the attentive reader may have noted that thirteen of the eighteen 
cases were filed in the U.S. district court in South Carolina.187  In the 1790s, 
the exclusive venue for an in rem admiralty action was the place where the 
ship was located.  French privateers routinely brought their prizes to 
Charleston, South Carolina, in part because Charleston “in the 1790s was a 
bastion of Francophilia.”188  Once a privateer brought his prize to Charleston, a 
ship owner who wanted to file an in rem action to obtain restitution of the 
captured prize had no choice but to file his claim in the South Carolina district 
court.  In those days, there was a single judge assigned to each federal district 
court.  Thomas Bee was the federal district judge for the district of South 
Carolina.  As discussed more fully in the next section, Judge Bee’s decisions 
were very influential in shaping the law related to French privateers because he 
decided most of the French privateering cases at the district court level,189 and 
the Supreme Court affirmed most of those decisions without any written 
opinion. 
C. Two Case Studies 
Recall that the Supreme Court held in Sloop Betsey that federal district 
courts have jurisdiction over claims for restitution by ship owners who allege 
that a privateer captured a neutral ship.190  Additionally, Congress enacted 
legislation granting district courts jurisdiction over claims for restitution in 
cases where privateers captured enemy ships in U.S. territorial waters.191  
However, the eighteen cases where ship owners or their agents filed in rem 
suits seeking restitution of enemy merchant vessels did not fit within either of 
these jurisdictional principles because all eighteen cases involved captures of 
enemy ships on the high seas.  In these eighteen cases, the libellants generally 
raised two types of allegations.  First, they alleged that the privateers had been 
illegally outfitted in U.S. ports or had augmented their forces in U.S. ports.  
Second, they alleged that the privateers were owned by Americans, 
 
 186. For the dates of the libels and the Supreme Court decisions see supra notes 162–78. 
 187. See supra notes 163–78. 
 188. 6 DHSC, supra note 10, at 651; see also JACKSON, supra note 26, at 3–6, 21–25. 
 189. Judge Bee’s decisions in admiralty cases are published in BEE’S ADMIRALTY REPORTS, 
supra note 17.  Many of these cases were also published later in the “Federal Cases” collection, 
first published in 1894.  That collection was intended to be “a comprehensive compilation of the 
decisions of the United States Circuit and District Courts” from 1789 to 1880.  Preface to 1 THE 
FEDERAL CASES COMPRISING CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, at iii (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1894). 
 190. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 191. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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commanded by U.S. citizens, or manned by U.S. citizens.  The legislation 
enacted by Congress in June 1794 created criminal penalties for individuals 
who accepted a commission from a foreign state,192 enlisted to serve on a 
foreign privateer,193 outfitted a foreign privateer in a U.S. port,194 or augmented 
the force of a privateer in a U.S. port.195  However, Congress did not explicitly 
authorize private claims for restitution to enforce these laws, nor did Congress 
explicitly authorize federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over these types of 
claims.196 
When libellants filed claims seeking restitution of vessels captured by 
French privateers, the French captors routinely invoked Article 17 of the 1778 
Treaty with France as a bar to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  In Sloop Betsey, 
the libellants persuaded the Supreme Court to sidestep Article 17 by noting 
that the Article, by its terms, applies only to “ships and goods taken from their 
enemies.”197  Therefore, they argued, the courts must undertake a factual 
inquiry to determine whether the vessel is an enemy vessel before they can 
conclude that Article 17 bars jurisdiction.  In the eighteen cases referenced 
above, the federal district courts effectively extended this logic to all 
allegations of unlawful captures.  Although the district courts eventually 
dismissed most of the cases on the grounds that Article 17 barred jurisdiction, 
they first undertook a factual inquiry to determine whether the capture was 
lawful. 
France thought this approach violated Article 17 for two reasons.  First, the 
district courts exercised in rem jurisdiction over French prizes while the claims 
were being adjudicated, thereby preventing French privateers from exercising 
their right under Article 17 “to carry whithersoever they please the ships and 
goods taken from their enemies.”198  Second, even though Article 17 prohibited 
U.S. courts from making “examination concerning the lawfulness of such 
prizes,”199 the district courts examined the merits of factual allegations 
supporting claims of unlawful captures before they dismissed the claims for 
lack of jurisdiction.  This section presents two case studies to illustrate, first, 
 
 192. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, §1, 1 Stat. 381, 381–82. 
 193. Id. § 2. 
 194. Id. § 3. 
 195. Id. § 4. 
 196. Claims alleging illegal recruitment of U.S. citizens and illegal outfitting in U.S. ports fell 
within the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Section 9 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.  See Act 
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.  When Congress enacted new legislation in 1794, 
it expressly authorized jurisdiction over claims involving captures in U.S. territorial waters, Act 
of June 5, 1794, § 6, but said nothing about jurisdiction over claims alleging illegal recruitment or 
outfitting.  Thus, French litigants made an “expresio unius” argument that the 1794 legislation 
precluded jurisdiction over these types of claims. 
 197. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 198. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII. 
 199. Id. 
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judicial decision making in the privateering cases, and second, U.S.-French 
diplomacy related to those cases. 
1. The Mermaid: A Case Study of Judicial Decision Making 
On January 12, 1795, the French privateer General Laveaux captured a 
British merchant vessel, The Mermaid, and brought her to Charleston, South 
Carolina.200  The British Consul in South Carolina, Benjamin Moodie, filed a 
libel seeking restitution of The Mermaid to its British owners.201  The libel 
alleged three grounds for restitution: (1) that the General Laveaux was owned 
by U.S. citizens; (2) that the General Laveaux had been illegally outfitted in 
Charleston; and (3) that “the greatest part of the crew . . . consisted of citizens 
of the United States.”202 
John Gaillard, the captain of General Laveaux, and Nicholas Gautier, the 
prize master of The Mermaid, filed an answer to Moodie’s libel.203  In their 
answer, they contested the factual allegations of the libel and pled Article 17 of 
the Treaty with France in bar to the libel.204  By invoking Article 17 as a “plea 
in bar” to the libel, the French were making a procedural move analogous to 
what would now be called a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  Judge 
Thomas Bee ruled “that the plea in bar of the Seventeenth Article of the Treaty 
with France filed in this cause is relevant and that the libel be dismissed with 
costs.”205  In other words, Judge Bee dismissed the libel on the grounds that 
Article 17 barred the exercise of jurisdiction. 
However, Judge Bee reached this conclusion only after he addressed the 
merits of each of the three claims raised in the libel.  After hearing evidence on 
those claims, Judge Bee concluded that the General Laveaux was not an 
American vessel, that she was not illegally outfitted in the United States, and 
that there was no evidence to support the charge that her crew consisted mostly 
of American citizens.206  In short, Judge Bee first addressed the merits of the 
claims raised in the libel and then dismissed the libel for lack of jurisdiction 
after concluding that those claims were without merit. 
 
 200. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
 201. See id. at 45. 
 202. British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. 169, 170 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1897). 
 203. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
 204. See id. at 45. 
 205. British Consul v. The Mermaid, decree of federal district court (Apr. 3, 1795), as 
reprinted in Moodie v. The Ship Mermaid (No. 17), microformed on Appellate Case Files 
(National Archives Microfilm Publications).  For reasons unknown to the author, the language 
quoted in the text is not reproduced in the district court opinion published in Federal Cases.  
However, Judge Bee used virtually identical language in dismissing all of the cases that the 
author reviewed in the Supreme Court archives. 
 206. See The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. at 170–71. 
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The district court decided The Mermaid fairly expeditiously.  Moodie filed 
his libel on February 26, 1795, and Judge Bee issued his decree on April 3, 
1795.207  However, the circuit court did not affirm Moodie’s decree until 
November 1795,208 and the Supreme Court did not issue its final decision until 
March 1796.209  Since it was an in rem proceeding, the district court retained 
custody over the prize while the case was pending in the circuit court and the 
Supreme Court.  France viewed this lengthy detention of the prize as a 
violation of Article 17, because judicial custody prevented the privateers from 
carrying their prize “whithersoever they please.”210  Moreover, from France’s 
perspective, insofar as the appellate courts affirmed a lower court ruling that 
addressed the merits of the claim that The Mermaid was captured illegally, the 
courts violated Article 17 by making “examination concerning the lawfulness 
of such prizes.”211 
The Supreme Court never published an opinion in The Mermaid.  
However, Justice Iredell produced a draft opinion that provides some support 
for French allegations that the courts were violating Article 17.212  To 
understand Justice Iredell’s analysis, it is necessary to elaborate on the 
underlying facts.213  The General Laveaux was originally an American vessel, 
the Cygnet.  The ship was docked in Charleston, South Carolina, for some time 
during the year 1794.  While in Charleston, work was done on the ship.  
According to the British libellants, this work constituted illegal outfitting.  
According to the French claimants, the ship underwent repairs, which were 
entirely legal.214  The ship sailed to Saint-Domingue, a French territory in the 
Caribbean, where it was purchased by Mathew Moreau, a French citizen.  (The 
British libellants alleged that the sale to Moreau was fraudulent; hence, the 
ship was still American.)  By the end of the year, the Cygnet had been renamed 
the General Laveaux.  The General Laveaux sailed as a privateer from Saint-
Domingue in late 1794 with a French commission.  It captured The Mermaid in 
January 1795. 
 
 207. See 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 45. 
 208. See id. at 47–48. 
 209. See Supreme Court Minutes (Mar. 1, 1796), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 265–
66. 
 210. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XVII. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, 
supra note 8, at 112–15. 
 213. This summary of the facts is drawn from three sources: British Consul v. The Mermaid, 
4 F. Cas. 169 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1897); 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 44–46; and JACKSON, supra 
note 26, at 69–72.  Although the three sources differ in certain details, the account presented here 
is generally consistent with all three. 
 214. Article 19 of the 1778 Treaty with France expressly grants French ships a right to carry 
out repairs in U.S. ports.  See 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 29, art. XIX. 
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Justice Iredell’s analysis is divided into three parts.215  First, he considered 
the allegation that the privateer had been “fitted out & equipped in 
America.”216  Justice Iredell wrote: 
Admitting the fact, this only a local offence against the Neutral Nation . . . 
[d]oes not in itself divest the property. . . . If therefore truly & bona fide 
alienated, she became French property, & as such the owners under a real 
French Commission had a right to cruize, & bringing her prizes into American 
Ports entitled to the protection of the 17 Art.217 
The implication of this statement is clear.  If a British libellant seeks restitution 
of a captured prize on the grounds that the French privateer was illegally 
outfitted in U.S. ports, the court should dismiss the claim without addressing 
the merits, because illegal outfitting, even if proven, would not invalidate the 
legality of a subsequent capture made by a French privateer with a valid 
commission.  Moreover, Article 17 precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into 
the lawfulness of the capture.  If this analysis is correct, Judge Bee violated 
Article 17 by examining the merits of the illegal outfitting claim, even though 
he eventually relied on Article 17 as a basis for dismissing the libel.218 
Second, Justice Iredell considered the argument that the June 1794 
legislation provided for forfeiture of a vessel that was illegally outfitted in U.S. 
ports.219  Consistent with the preceding analysis, he wrote: “Admitting a 
Forfeiture had incurred by a special Law of the U.S., this would not invalidate 
a prize taken by her after a bona fide alienation to a real French Citizen in 
another Country.”220  Iredell agreed that the United States could institute a 
forfeiture action against the privateer, but forfeiture of the privateer “does not 
necessarily infer a forfeiture of all the Prizes which such Vessel might take.”221  
Moreover, “a fair capture under a real French Commission by real French 
Citizens would be exempt from any enquiry of . . . ours,”222 because such 
enquiry is prohibited by Article 17 and the law of nations.  In short, the U.S. 
statute authorizing forfeiture of privateers that were illegally outfitted in U.S. 
 
 215. See James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, 
supra note 8, at 112–15. 
 216. Id. at 112. 
 217. Id.  The quotes are taken from Justice Iredell’s notes, which did not contain complete 
sentences.  The author has chosen to use the actual text of the original, rather than trying to 
correct the grammar. 
 218. The same logic would apply to the allegation in the libel that most of the crew of the 
General Laveaux were Americans.  Dismissal of this claim was not appealed because the 
libellants failed to adduce any evidence in support of this claim in the district court. 
 219. See James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, 
supra note 8, at 112–14; see also Act of June 5, 1794, ch.50, § 3, 1 Stat. 381, 383. 
 220. James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra 
note 8, at 112 (footnote omitted). 
 221. Id. at 114. 
 222. Id. 
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ports did not authorize U.S. courts to adjudicate the merits of claims for 
restitution of vessels captured by those privateers. 
Third, Justice Iredell addressed the allegation that the General Laveaux 
was actually American property, not French property.  “If this appeared clearly 
to [the] Court,” he wrote, then the captured prize “ought to be restored.”223  
Although Justice Iredell did not fully articulate his rationale, he was probably 
drawing a distinction between actions that violated U.S. law, such as illegal 
outfitting, and actions that violated the law of nations.  If an American-owned 
vessel purported to act as a French privateer, any capture made by that vessel 
would be invalid under the law of nations,224 and the illegality of the capture 
would require restitution of the captured prize.  Justice Iredell emphasized the 
“[i]mportance of the 17 Article,” and warned that restitution based on alleged 
American ownership of the privateer should not be awarded “upon light or 
doubtful grounds.”225  If U.S. courts accepted allegations of American 
ownership too easily, then Article 17 would be “of no value,” and the owners 
of captured prizes would raise “a Claim in every case.”226 
By the time Justice Iredell wrote his draft opinion, in March 1796, the 
French privateers had already abandoned American ports in favor of French 
ports in the Caribbean.227  Thus, even if Iredell’s opinion had been published, it 
would not have had any effect on the decisions of lower courts, because those 
courts were adjudicating the French privateer cases in 1794 and 1795, when 
the privateers were still bringing their prizes into U.S. ports.  As illustrated by 
Judge Bee’s decision in The Mermaid, the lower courts generally addressed the 
merits of illegal outfitting claims before they dismissed the claims for lack of 
jurisdiction (contrary to Justice Iredell’s preferred approach).  By manifesting 
their willingness to adjudicate the merits of those claims, the courts, perhaps 
unwittingly, encouraged British, Spanish and Dutch libellants to file “a claim 
in every case,” as Justice Iredell warned. 
2. The Sans Pareil: A Case Study of U.S.-French Diplomacy 
On July 27, 1794, the French privateer Sans Pareil captured the British 
merchant vessel Perseverance.228  The privateer put on board a prize crew led 
by Jean Bernard.  Bernard sailed Perseverance to Newport, Rhode Island, 
 
 223. Id. (alteration in original). 
 224. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795) (affirming decree by Judge Thomas 
Bee, which ordered restitution of a Dutch vessel captured by individuals claiming to be French 
privateers, in part because one of the self-styled privateers was a U.S. citizen who had never 
received a valid commission from the French government). 
 225. James Iredell’s Notes for a Supreme Court Opinion (Mar. 1, 1796), in 7 DHSC, supra 
note 8, at 114. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See infra Part III.D. 
 228. The summary of facts in this paragraph is taken from 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 811–13. 
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arriving there on August 13.  The next day, Thomas Moore, the British vice-
consul in Rhode Island, wrote to the Governor alleging that the Perseverance 
had been captured illegally and seeking restoration of the captured vessel to its 
British owner.  The Governor, Arthur Fenner, seized the vessel pending 
resolution of the dispute.  Joseph Fauchet, the French Ambassador in 
Philadelphia, soon learned about the case. 
On August 26, 1794, Fauchet wrote to Secretary of State Randolph to 
protest.  Fauchet’s letter began by noting that he had received “a great number 
of complaints” regarding the “vexations which our privateers are made to 
experience at the instigation of English agents.”229  Fauchet clearly believed 
that France’s enemies were initiating frivolous legal proceedings to harass 
French privateers.  His letter referred to “those unjust and odious proceedings,” 
and to “those miserable chicaneries, shamefully employed to damp the courage 
of the mariners.”230  Then, he specifically addressed the Sans Pareil: 
I pray you to cause orders to be given to the officers of the customs at 
Newport, to restore to the agent of the republic, the prize made by the privateer 
Sans Pareil. . . . [T]his prize has been seized, and under the pretext that the 
privateer Sans Pareil had been armed in the ports of the United States.  If this 
pretext had been really alleged, a more glaring injustice and more palpable 
falsehood could not have been disguised . . . but, perhaps, as has frequently 
happened, they have only wished to discourage and fatigue the captors, by 
injuring the prize, from the length of time required for obtaining the decision, 
which they will retard by a thousand unfair expedients.  In this case, sir, it is at 
length time to take a determination which will secure the interests of the 
captors, who, without this precaution, will be always injured, whatever may be 
the determination of the courts; they will be affected, first by the loss of time; 
secondly, by the expenses in prosecuting this business; and, lastly, by waste in 
the merchandises and vessels which they shall have taken.231 
Thus, from France’s perspective, even when French privateers ultimately 
prevailed in legal proceedings, they were still the losers, because the legal 
proceedings cost them valuable time and money.  Moreover, the loss of time 
and money adversely affected France’s strategic interests by providing 
economic disincentives to privateering, thereby making it harder to recruit 
additional privateers.232 
 
 229. Letter from Joseph Fauchet to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 26, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 588. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. It bears emphasis that the economic disincentive to privateering was not an ordinary 
incident of naval warfare during this era.  In the “typical” naval conflict, a privateer could obtain 
a speedy judgment by bringing a captured vessel to a prize court in his home country; this process 
rarely led to protracted litigation.  However, in the American theater of the war between France 
and Great Britain, the British were able to exploit the geographic distance between the United 
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On September 3, 1794, Secretary Randolph wrote to Fauchet to inform him 
that he had “urged the Governor of Rhode Island to report, without delay, the 
case of the prize taken by the privateer Sans Pareil.”233  Randolph added: “Be 
assured, sir . . . that the Government of the United States will not suffer the 
acquisitions of the French privateers to be wrested from them, without 
adequate cause; nor yet, that they should be wantonly vexed by unjust 
detentions.”234  Two days later, on September 5, Governor Fenner ruled in 
favor of the French privateers and “ordered the Perseverance delivered to” the 
French captors.235  On September 27, Randolph wrote to Fauchet to report the 
good news.236  However, the communication from Governor Fenner to 
Secretary Randolph to Ambassador Fauchet lagged far behind the pace of 
actual events. 
The French captors sold the Perseverance and its cargo on September 8, 
1794.237  However, before they could escape with the funds, the British owner, 
Thomas Jennings, “secured a monition requiring the United States marshal to 
retain the funds” and filed a libel in the federal district court.238  In the libel, 
Jennings alleged two violations of the June 1794 legislation enacted by 
Congress.  He claimed “that the Sans Pareil had been augmented in force” in 
Charleston, South Carolina,239 in violation of Section 4 of the statute, and that 
the Sans Pareil was “to an extent manned with Americans,”240 in violation of 
Section 2.  He also alleged that none of the Frenchmen on board the Sans 
Pareil had a valid commission.241  For all of these reasons, he claimed that the 
capture of the Perseverance was illegal, and he sought damages to compensate 
him for the loss of the ship and its cargo. 
 
States and the nearest French prize courts by subjecting French privateers to protracted litigation 
when they brought their captured prizes to U.S. ports. 
 233. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sept. 3, 1794), in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 588; see also Letter from Edmund Randolph to Arthur Fenner (Sept. 3, 1794), in 1 
ASPFR, supra note 18, at 589 (discussing the Sans Pareil and noting that the French Ambassador 
is concerned that “the ardor of French privateers [may] be damped by the vexations which a 
seizure of their prizes may produce”). 
 234. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet (Sept. 3, 1794)  in 1 ASPFR, supra 
note 18, at 588. 
 235. 7 DHSC, supra note 8, at 812–13.  In August 1793—after several district courts had 
dismissed French privateering cases for lack of jurisdiction and before the Supreme Court issued 
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When Fauchet learned that the British owner had initiated judicial 
proceedings, after the Governor of Rhode Island had already ruled in favor of 
the French captors, he was furious.  On October 17, 1794, Fauchet wrote to 
Randolph as follows: 
You announce to me that La Perseverance, prize to the Sans Pareil, had been 
delivered to the captors by order of the Governor of Rhode Island; in contempt 
of that decision the English agents have just created new difficulties . . . . It is 
impossible, sir, for this state of things to continue much longer.  You are 
sensible how necessary it will be to retrench from our treaty the article which 
reciprocally permits the ships of war of the two nations to conduct to, and sell 
their prizes in, their respective ports, should this right become illusory and void 
by the difficulty thrown in the way of its execution.  I proposed a method as 
simple as it is just, for putting an end to this tyrannical chicanery: this method 
was, to require security from those who prosecuted prizes as illegal.  Were this 
measure adopted, it would render our enemies less ingenious in their 
proceedings, and prevent them from bringing so many actions . . . . 
  . . . I expect, sir, that the Federal Government will put an end to these 
persecutions by the mode I have proposed, or by any other which its wisdom 
may suggest.242 
Randolph was evidently sympathetic to Fauchet’s plea.243  Nevertheless, he 
told Fauchet pointedly that the Executive Branch could not intervene in 
ongoing judicial proceedings and that the judiciary was the proper branch of 
government to resolve disputes between French privateers and British ship 
owners: 
If, however, individuals conceive that they have a legal claim upon her, and 
draw her before a court of law, the Executive of the United States cannot 
forbid them.  The plea, under [Article 17 of] the treaty, that the court has no 
cognizance of French prizes, will be admitted if it applies, and the person by 
whom the process is instituted will be liable to a judgment for costs and 
damages, if he fails in his proof. 
  The bond, which you propose as a security against vexation, we have no 
power to demand, because the Executive do not mean to interfere, without 
presumptive proof of title; and this presumption, when established, would 
seem to be a sufficient protection against being harassed.  The courts have their 
forms . . . . I am not authorized to make the arrangement proposed.244 
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Thus, Randolph tacitly acknowledged that Article 17 barred the exercise of 
jurisdiction by U.S. courts in certain cases.  However, the courts had to 
exercise jurisdiction for the limited purpose of deciding whether Article 17 
applied.  Moreover, in Randolph’s view, if Fauchet wanted to offer suggestions 
about procedural innovations to minimize vexatious lawsuits, he should direct 
those suggestions to the judiciary, because there was no basis for the Executive 
to intervene in the affairs of an independent branch of government. 
Despite Ambassador Fauchet’s best efforts to assist the privateers who had 
a legitimate claim to the funds from the sale of The Perseverance, the judicial 
process consumed almost two-and-a-half years.  The French captors could not 
obtain access to the funds until February 1797, when the Supreme Court issued 
its final decision in Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance.245 
D. The End of French Privateering in the United States 
“By early November 1795,” French privateering activities in U.S. ports 
“had all but ceased.”246  There were three key factors that contributed to the 
decline of French privateering in the United States: the Jay Treaty,247 lawfare 
in U.S. courts, and geo-political developments in the Caribbean. 
In the spring of 1794, “the British had a stranglehold on French 
possessions in the Caribbean.”248  Since the British denied French privateers 
access to French ports in the Caribbean, and the privateers did not want to 
carry their prizes across the Atlantic to sell them in France, the best economic 
choice was to sell their prizes in U.S. ports.  However, the strategic situation in 
the Caribbean changed dramatically between June 1794 and late 1795.  France 
launched a successful attack against the British in Guadeloupe in June 1794.249  
Having reestablished a foothold in the Caribbean, France bided its time over 
the next several months.  Then, between March and June of 1795, France 
launched a major offensive that led to a string of French victories in the 
Caribbean.250  In July 1795, the Treaty of Basel terminated hostilities between 
France and Spain.251  By the end of 1795, France and Spain had become allies 
in a war against Great Britain.252  As a result of these developments, French 
privateers were able to take their prizes to French prize courts in the 
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Caribbean.  These “new privateering opportunities” in the Caribbean operated 
as a “magnet that drew the French privateers away from” the United States.253 
The economic magnet of privateering opportunities in the Caribbean 
combined with the financial drain imposed by British lawfare in U.S. courts to 
lure French privateers away from U.S. ports toward French ports in the 
Caribbean.  The privateers did not need to be financial wizards to calculate the 
costs and benefits of the two options.  Since the French could not operate prize 
courts in the United States, prizes sold in the United States without prior 
condemnation by a prize court invariably sold at a reduced price.254  Moreover, 
if a commander brought his captured prize to a U.S. port, he could expect the 
gains from his business venture to be tied up in U.S. courts for twelve to 
eighteen months.255  Unless he had a cushion of cash reserves on hand, he 
would be unable to pay his crew, making it difficult, if not impossible, to hire 
crew for the next voyage.  In contrast, if he took his prize to a French port in 
the Caribbean, he could obtain a judgment from a French prize court, sell the 
prize quickly at full value, and use the profits to finance additional privateering 
ventures. 
The United States and Great Britain signed the Jay Treaty in November 
1794, and the Treaty entered into force in October 1795.256  By October 1795, 
many of the French privateers had already abandoned U.S. ports in favor of 
Caribbean ports.  For those who continued bringing prizes to U.S. ports, 
however, the Jay Treaty was the final nail in the coffin.  Article 24 expressly 
prohibited privateers commissioned by France from selling their prizes in U.S. 
ports as long as France was at war with Great Britain.257 The French 
Ambassador protested vehemently that “the stipulations of the treaty concluded 
with England . . . destroy the effect of [France’s] treaty with the United 
States.”258  Article 25 of the Jay Treaty preserved French rights under the 1778 
Treaty between the United States and France.259  However, Secretary of State 
Pickering maintained that Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty never actually gave 
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French privateers a right to sell their prizes in U.S. ports: the United States had 
simply permitted French privateers to sell their prizes in U.S. ports as a matter 
of policy.260  Thus, although Article 25 of the Jay Treaty preserved France’s 
preexisting legal rights under Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty, Article 24 of the 
Jay Treaty provided the controlling rule because it expressly prohibited sales of 
French prizes in U.S. ports, and this prohibition was not contrary to any legal 
right granted under the 1778 Treaty.261 
In sum, the British lawfare strategy was undoubtedly a success in the sense 
that it was one of three key factors that helped induce French privateers to 
abandon the use of U.S. ports as a base of operations.  However, the broader 
military consequences of the strategy are difficult to assess.  It is likely that 
Great Britain gained some strategic advantage because British merchant 
vessels had easier access to U.S. ports after the French privateers moved south 
to the Caribbean.  On the other hand, the advantage to France of greater access 
to French ports in the Caribbean may have offset the disadvantages for France 
associated with the exodus of French privateers from U.S. ports. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis of the French privateering cases demonstrates that 
the exclusive political control thesis is inconsistent with the Founders’ 
understanding of the constitutional separation of powers in foreign affairs.  
This concluding section briefly highlights two important historical points and 
discusses the contemporary relevance of the privateering cases. 
The first key historical point relates to Great Britain’s use of lawfare 
tactics.  As noted above, the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in 2003 that 
lawfare was a “new phenomenon.”262  Part III showed that lawfare is not a new 
phenomenon; Great Britain used lawfare tactics successfully in the 1790s to 
help induce French privateers to stop bringing their prizes into U.S. ports. 
Second, although the privateering cases raised significant national security 
and foreign policy issues that were intimately connected to U.S. neutrality 
policy, the Washington Administration chose to defer to the Judicial Branch 
and allow judicial decision making in the privateering cases to guide the 
implementation of U.S. neutrality policy.  Four factors help explain the 
government’s decision to handle these cases by means of private adjudication 
in the courts, rather than diplomatic negotiation conducted by the Executive 
Branch.  First, many of the cases required someone to scrutinize large amounts 
of conflicting evidence, and the Executive Branch did not have the personnel 
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to handle that task.263  Second, the main goal of U.S. policy was to preserve 
U.S. neutrality; since the British and French were adversaries in most of the 
cases, it helped promote an appearance of neutrality to let the judiciary serve as 
a neutral decision maker, rather than having the Executive Branch resolve legal 
disputes between the British and the French.  Third, given the natural law 
viewpoint that was prevalent among the Founders, many of the Founders 
probably believed that the ship owners had a natural right to present their 
claims in court to defend their property rights.  Finally, resolution of the 
privateering cases required a decision maker to apply general legal rules in 
specific factual situations that involved disputes over the property rights of 
private parties.  Some members of the founding generation probably believed 
that the Constitution granted the Judicial Branch primary (but not exclusive) 
responsibility for deciding cases involving the rights of private parties that 
required the application of law to fact. 
The French privateering cases are similar to modern war on terror cases in 
one key respect—in both sets of cases, questions of private rights are 
inextricably linked to questions of international law and U.S. foreign policy.  
Of course, there are also key differences between the two sets of cases.  The 
United States was a party in only two of the twenty-four privateering cases that 
are the focus of this study.264  In contrast, the U.S. government is a party to 
most of the modern war on terror cases.265  Moreover, both the Legislative and 
Executive Branches encouraged active judicial involvement in the privateering 
cases in the 1790s.  In contrast, the Legislative and Executive Branches have 
worked together in the past few years to minimize judicial involvement in 
cases arising from the war on terror.266 
Despite these differences, the privateering cases do offer an important 
pragmatic lesson that is still relevant today.  According to the New York 
Times, “people in Britain and France told pollsters last spring that they had 
 
 263. During the period under study, there was no “Department of Justice,” and the Attorney 
General did not have any staff to support him.  The Secretary of State had a total domestic staff 
(not counting overseas Ambassadors and consuls) of about six to eight clerks.  See List of Civil 
Officers of the United States, Except Judges, with Their Emoluments, for the Year Ending Oct. 1, 
1792 (Feb. 27, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 57–59 (Walter Lowrie & 
Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834), available at  http://memory.loc.gov/ 
ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html; see also Roll of the Officers, Civil, Military, and Naval, of the 
United States (Feb. 17, 1802), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS, supra, at 260, 
302, 304.  
 264. United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); United States v. Peters, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795). 
 265. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 266. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2631 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (note)); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (note)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
196 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:145 
even less confidence in [President Bush] to do the right thing in world affairs 
than they had in President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.”267  U.S. foreign policy 
cannot succeed if our key allies do not trust us to comply with our international 
legal obligations.  The Founders understood this: they wanted to convey a 
message to the world that the United States was committed to the rule of law in 
international affairs.  In the 1790s, the Executive Branch reinforced this 
message by deferring to the judiciary and allowing federal courts to decide key 
issues related to French privateering activities.  In the current geopolitical 
situation, if the government wants to persuade U.S. allies that the United States 
is committed to complying with its international legal obligations, it can 
promote that objective by inviting judicial scrutiny of U.S. policies in the war 
on terror, at least in cases where those policies are intimately bound up with 
questions of international law and individual rights.  In contrast, continued 
resistance to judicial oversight reinforces the belief, which is widely shared 
among the citizens of some of our closest allies, that the United States views 
international law with a mixture of contempt and indifference. 
Political realists might explain the differences between the 1790s and 
today as a function of political power.  Weak states are receptive to 
international law because it has the potential to constrain their stronger 
adversaries.  Strong states are less receptive because international law tends to 
equalize power imbalances among states, thereby reducing the comparative 
advantage of stronger states.  The United States embraced international law in 
the 1790s because it was a weak state; the United States is suspicious of 
international law today because it is a strong state.  This explanation is fairly 
persuasive, as far as it goes.  But it does not answer the key normative 
question: Is it generally in the national interest of the United States to comply 
with its international legal obligations, and to be perceived as complying with 
those obligations?  There is ample room for disagreement on this question, but 
a President who wants to persuade the world that the United States takes its 
international legal obligations seriously could advance that goal by 
encouraging a more active role for the federal judiciary in the implementation 
of U.S. foreign policy. 
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